Natural Born Citizen by Lee, Thomas H.
American University Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 2 Article 7
2018
"Natural Born Citizen"
Thomas H. Lee
Fordham Law School, thlee@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Thomas H. (2018) ""Natural Born Citizen"," American University Law Review: Vol. 67 : Iss. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol67/iss2/7
"Natural Born Citizen"
Keywords
Jus soli, Jus sanguinis, Presidential eligibility
This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol67/iss2/7
 327 
LEAD ARTICLE 
 
“NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” 
THOMAS H. LEE* 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution states that a person must be a “natural 
born Citizen” to be eligible to be President.  This Article surveys relevant evidence 
and explains what the phrase likely meant when the Constitution was adopted 
between 1787 and 1789.  The phrase at the time encompassed three categories 
of persons:  (1) persons born within the United States; (2) persons born outside 
of the United States to U.S. citizens in government service; and (3) persons born 
outside of the United States to U.S. citizen fathers who had resided in the United 
States but went abroad temporarily for a private purpose, like merchants who 
traveled on business.  This definition corresponded with contemporaneous 
English law understandings of “natural born subjects,” the natural law 
birthright principles of jus soli (the law of soil) and jus sanguinis (the law of 
blood or parentage), and the law of nations—the key jurisprudential sources 
consulted by Americans on matters of citizenship in the late eighteenth-century 
world order.  This novel interpretation of the original meaning of “natural born 
Citizen” departs from the conventional wisdom that the phrase refers to a person 
who is a citizen under the U.S. naturalization statutes in effect at the person’s 
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birth, a view recently espoused by two former Solicitors General of the United 
States, Paul Clement and Neal Katyal.  My interpretation also differs from the 
leading alternative view of the original meaning of the phrase, namely that it 
refers to persons born in the United States or outside of the United States to U.S. 
officials only.  A brief conclusion explores the implications of the recovered 
original meaning of “natural born Citizen” for presidential eligibility today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution provides:  “No Person except a natural born 
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption 
of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President.”1  This 
Article offers a comprehensive account of the original meaning of 
“natural born Citizen.”  This is an important contribution for three 
reasons.  First, the U.S. Supreme Court has never decided what the 
words mean, and the phrase’s original meaning is sure to loom large 
in any future ruling, even for non-originalists.2  Nevertheless, intense 
                                               
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 2. I do not mean to suggest that originalism is the only method of constitutional 
interpretation or that it is the best method; my point is that the original meaning is 
2017] “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” 329 
 
prior scrutiny and scholarship has yielded no definitive answer to date,3 
and this Article mines newly discovered evidence.  Second, several 
presidential candidates, including Barry Goldwater, George Romney, 
and John McCain, faced allegations that they were not natural born 
citizens.4  Accusations were also leveled against President Barack 
Obama on the specious theory that he was born outside the United 
States to a foreign father and a U.S. citizen mother.5  Most recently, 
doubts were raised during the 2016 presidential primaries whether 
Senator Ted Cruz, who was born in 1970 in Canada to a U.S. citizen 
mother and a non-U.S. citizen father, was a natural born citizen.6  The 
                                               
the starting point for any approach to constitutional interpretation.  Nor is this Article 
addressed to methodological debates within originalism itself, e.g., intent versus public 
meaning.  Rather, the aim is to provide an accurate and complete understanding of 
what the words “natural born Citizen” in Article II likely meant between 1787 and 1789 
when the Constitution was adopted. 
 3. Commentators have noted “speculation on the scope of the language,” its 
“[d]angerous [a]mbiguity,” and referred to the Clause as an “[u]nresolved [e]nigma.”  
JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42097, QUALIFICATIONS FOR PRESIDENT AND THE 
“NATURAL BORN” CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT 1 (2016); see also Sarah Helene 
Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, “Natural Born” in the USA:  The Striking Unfairness and 
Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need 
to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 147 (2005); Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the 
United States:  The Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968).  Other prominent 
examples of scholarship on the meaning of “natural born Citizen” include EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 38–40 (5th rev. ed. 1984); 
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789:  A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 137 (1923); Christina S. Lohman, Presidential Eligibility:  The 
Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 349, 369–71 (2000); J. 
Michael Medina, The Presidential Qualification Clause in this Bicentennial Year:  The Need 
to Eliminate the Natural Born Citizen Requirement, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 253, 262–68 
(1987); Michael Nelson, Constitutional Qualifications for President, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. 
Q. 383, 396 (1987); Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 
2005 BYU L. REV. 927, 937–41 (2005); John Yinger, The Origins and Interpretation of the 
Presidential Eligibility Clause in the U.S. Constitution:  Why Did the Founding Fathers Want the 
President to Be a “Natural-Born Citizen” and What Does this Clause Mean for Foreign-Born 
Adoptees? (rev. ed., Apr. 6, 2000) (unpublished commentary), 
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/jyinger/citizenship/history.htm. 
 4. See Carl Huse, McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether That Rules 
Him Out, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/02/28/us/politics/28mccain.html (discussing the allegations Barry Goldwater, 
George Romney, and John McCain faced during their respective presidential campaigns). 
 5. See, e.g., Elliott v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646, 653 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 134 
A.3d 51 (Pa. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 169 (2016). 
 6. See Williams v. Cruz, OAL DKT. NO. STE 5016-16, 2016 WL 1554252, at *17 
(N.J. Admin. Apr. 12, 2016) (holding Cruz to be a “natural born Citizen” and thus an 
eligible candidate for the U.S. presidential election in New Jersey); Thomas Lee, 
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specific issue is almost certain to arise again:  for instance, Cruz may 
run for President in 2020 or thereafter, and there will likely be future 
U.S. presidential candidates with international ties given the pace and 
scope of globalization.  Finally, the Natural Born Citizen Clause 
provides an illuminating case study in how to do originalism and the 
types of sources it entails.  The original meaning of constitutional 
provisions is often elusive; however, the Natural Born Citizen Clause is 
a rare case in which careful examination of all relevant evidence 
supplies a meaning. 
There are two leading views of the original meaning of the 
constitutional requirement to be a “natural born Citizen” for 
presidential eligibility.  The first, espoused most recently by Professors 
Einer Elhauge and Mary Brigid McManamon, is that a natural born 
citizen who is eligible to be President is any person born within the 
United States, unless the person is the child of a foreign ambassador 
or enemy soldier.7  By the same token, any person born outside of the 
United States to a U.S. ambassador or to a U.S. soldier in a hostile army 
would also be a “natural born Citizen” of the United States.8  The idea 
that membership in a polity is determined principally by birthplace is 
known by the Latinism jus soli—the “law of soil.”9  Proponents of this 
view assert that jus soli was the common law of England as to who was a 
“natural born subject,” and that the U.S. Constitution’s “natural born 
                                               
Opinion-Editorial, Is Ted Cruz a “Natural Born Citizen”?  Not if You’re a Constitutional 
Originalist., L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-
ed/la-oe-lee-is-ted-cruz-eligible-to-be-president-20160110-story.html (explaining that 
because Cruz was born in Calgary, Canada to a non-citizen father, an originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution would bar him from becoming president). 
 7. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Einer Elhauge on the Justiciability and 
Meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Requirement at 12, Elliott v. Cruz, 134 A.3d 51 
(Pa. 2016) (No. 29 MAP 2016), 2016 WL 2732221, at *12; Mary Brigid McManamon, 
The Natural Born Citizen Clause as Originally Understood, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 317, 347 
(2015) (concluding that no one born outside the United States to U.S. citizen parents 
is “a ‘natural born [C]itizen’” eligible to be President “aside from children born to 
U.S. ambassadors or soldiers in hostile armies”). 
 8. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 347; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor 
Einer Elhauge on the Justiciability and Meaning of the Natural Born Citizen 
Requirement, supra note 7, at 17 (describing the narrow exception to the native-birth 
requirement as including children born to military personnel serving in a foreign 
country). 
 9. Gordon, supra note 3, at 6 (defining jus soli as a “basic tenet of the English 
common law”). 
2017] “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” 331 
 
Citizen” requirement for presidential eligibility adopted the same 
English meaning.10 
This viewpoint is wrong on both counts:  jus soli was not the exclusive 
rule at English common law, and the English common law of natural 
born subjectship was not the exclusive source of the meaning of 
“natural born Citizen” in Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  “Common 
law” in this context means the evolving customary law of England as 
reflected not only in judicial decisions, but also in landmark statutes.  
Further, early Americans also consulted treatises summarizing English 
law, most importantly William Blackstone’s Commentaries.11 
First, jus soli may have been the ancient Anglo-Saxon common law 
before the Norman conquest of 1066, but it was not the sole principle 
of natural born subjectship at English common law when the U.S. 
Constitution was adopted centuries later.  As historian James Kettner 
put it, “English jurists had no conscious attachment to the jus soli . . . .  
Ancestry could also determine who was a ‘natural-born subject.’”12  In 
fact, starting in 1350, Parliament passed statutes bestowing subject 
status upon the foreign-born children of English subjects, thereby 
invoking the other great Western natural law birthright principle, jus 
sanguinis—the “law of blood” or parentage.13  Jus sanguinis was the 
Roman rule of citizenship, and it was long dominant on the European 
continent with its shifting borders and overlapping allegiances.14  But, 
jus sanguinis penetrated England and then Great Britain, especially in 
its eighteenth-century mercantilist phase, by which time Parliament 
had long extended “natural born” status to the foreign-born children 
of British subjects in government service and of British fathers 
                                               
 10. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 320–21.  Although the U.S. Supreme Court 
has never decided the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, it has asserted that 
the U.S. constitutional law of citizenship adopts jus soli via English common law.  See 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 434 n.11 (1998) (affirming citizenship at birth for 
persons born within the United States but noting that U.S. “citizenship does not pass 
by descent” other than as provided by congressional statute); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 
815, 828 (1971) (acknowledging that the United States follows the English standard of 
jus soli where the place of birth governs citizenship). 
 11. See generally 1–4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. 
 12. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608–1870 13 (1978). 
 13. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 
(Eng.); see GORDON, supra note 3, at 6 (defining jus sanguinis as the rule determining 
nationality in most European countries where “nationality could be transmitted by 
descent at the moment of birth”). 
 14. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 17–28 (discussing the complications of 
nationality arising from allegiances to different countries within the United Kingdom). 
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generally.15  Some of the most settled of these statutes, by virtue of their 
ancient and uncontroversial status, had become part of the common 
law tradition, not departures from it.  However, descent by parentage 
had a gender skew under natural law in late eighteenth-century Europe 
and America:  the father’s blood determined the political allegiance of 
free persons at birth; the mother was legally irrelevant.16 
Second, although English common law was the principal source of 
U.S. constitutional law, it was not the only source.  The common law 
was the taproot of U.S. constitutional provisions with an English 
pedigree like habeas corpus and the criminal and civil jury trial rights, 
but early Americans did not reflexively adopt the British law of natural 
born subjects in defining who was a natural born citizen eligible for the 
Presidency.  The British Empire had “subjects” whose allegiance to the 
Crown was viewed as analogous to a child’s obeisance to a parent, a 
bond the Americans had fought to escape.17  “Citizens” of the 
American republic, by contrast, were seen as bound by explicit or 
implicit consent to a society of equals, analogous to a social contract.18  
The ramifications of this political-theory distinction between subject 
and citizen for “natural born” status are underappreciated.  The 
concept of citizenship that Americans embraced attributed greater 
independence and agency to individuals to pass on their political 
allegiance, by contrast to subjectship which presumed that allegiance 
was solely a function of birth within the sovereign’s domains. 
Because of the misfit between English monarchical notions of 
subjectship and the general republican concept of citizenship, the law 
of nations and natural law are also important sources in determining 
what “natural born Citizen” in Article II means.  Indeed, even 
prominent English common law judges like Lord Coke always believed 
natural law was the ultimate source of “natural born subject” status and 
of the common law generally.19  And there was a direct link between 
                                               
 15. See ALEXANDER COCKBURN, NATIONALITY:  OR THE LAW RELATING TO SUBJECTS 
AND ALIENS, CONSIDERED WITH A VIEW TO FUTURE LEGISLATION 28–31 (London, William 
Ridgway 1869) (describing the development of laws governing nationality in England 
and pointing out the long history of English antecedents for the subject status of 
children born abroad to English fathers and royal servants). 
 16. See id. at 11–12 (noting that children born to alien fathers did not inherit 
citizenship even if the mother was English). 
 17. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 3–4. 
 18. See id. at 9–10. 
 19. See Calvin v. Smith (Calvin’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 377 391–92 (K.B. 1608) 
(affirming the rule that one born on English soil is a natural born subject of the 
English king as part of the common law and jura natura—natural laws).  See generally 
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the law of nature and the law of nations:  Emer de Vattel, the Swiss 
republican jurist who rivaled Blackstone as an essential reference for 
Americans on defining citizenship,20 called the law of nations “the law 
of nature, applied to the conduct and affairs of nations and 
sovereigns.”21  The “law of nations” in Vattel’s usage, shared by early 
Americans, included general principles common to all civilized 
nations, such as jus sanguinis.  In sum, the adopters of the U.S. 
Constitution likely accepted both natural law principles, jus soli—for 
persons born within the country—and jus sanguinis—for persons born 
outside the country to American fathers, in their understanding of 
what it means to be a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be President.  
And, as a more general matter, they embraced both principles of 
citizenship as a means to grow the population and trans-Atlantic 
commerce of their new nation. 
The other leading view of the original meaning of “natural born 
Citizen” in Article II holds that it refers not only to any person born in 
the United States (and thus a citizen by jus soli) but also to any person 
born abroad who is a U.S. citizen at birth under then-applicable 
congressional statutes.22  Proponents of this view, espoused by a 
majority of modern commentators, including former U.S. Solicitor 
General Paul Clement and former Acting Solicitor General Neal 
Katyal,23 Professors Michael Ramsey and Akhil Amar,24 and Judge Jill 
                                               
Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. 
& HUMAN. 73, 74 (1997) (noting Coke’s influence on early American courts and his 
assertion that he and his fellow judges were to decide Calvin’s Case on “divine law of 
nature” principles that were part of English law and the Creator’s law). 
 20. A telling marker of the co-equal, canonical status of Blackstone’s and Vattel’s 
two books as references on foreign relations law for early Americans was the fact that 
they were the first two books the Senate purchased for its library in 1794.  See S. 
JOURNAL, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1793) (ordering the purchase of the Blackstone and 
Vattel books for the Senate). 
 21. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 1 (Béla Kapossy & 
Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1797). 
 22. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 341. 
 23. See Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, Commentary, On the Meaning of “Natural Born 
Citizen,” 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 161 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/on-
the-meaning-of-natural-born-citizen. 
 24. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural Born,” 20 U. PA. J.  
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Why Ted Cruz Is Eligible to Be President, CNN (Jan. 14, 2016, 11:59 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/13/opinions/amar-cruz-trump-natural-born-citizen. 
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Pryor (in her Yale Law Journal Note authored while a student),25 argue 
that Congress’s Article I, Section 8 power “[t]o establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization”26 encompasses the power to establish birthright 
citizenship for presidential eligibility purposes.  With specific respect 
to Senator Cruz, many of these commentators assert that he is eligible 
to be President because the controlling statute when he was born 
declared that children born abroad to one U.S. citizen parent were 
U.S. citizens at birth, subject only to a residency requirement for the 
parent and child, which Cruz had met.27  This 1952 statute, which had 
replaced an earlier 1934 version, codified jus sanguinis subject to 
parental and child residency requirements.28 
The relevant evidence indicates that this view of complete 
congressional discretion over who counts as a “natural born Citizen,” 
like the jus soli-only view, is incorrect as a matter of original meaning, 
particularly because it paradoxically rejects natural law and embraces 
positive law as the basis for natural born citizenship.  The founding 
Americans who adopted the Constitution did not seek to grant plenary 
power to Congress in setting the citizenship standards for presidential 
eligibility.  Indeed, a proposal by Alexander Hamilton at the 1787 
Constitutional Convention to permit Congress to use its uniform 
Naturalization Power to set citizenship standards for congressional 
eligibility was decisively rejected.29  Nor is there any affirmative 
evidence from the Constitution’s drafting or ratifying conventions, or 
any sources whatsoever, that supports the claim that Congress’s Article 
I Naturalization power encompassed power to tinker with Article II’s 
separate “natural born Citizen” requirement.  If Congress did have 
such a power to define the citizens eligible to be President, then what 
was the point of specifying in the Constitution that someone had to be 
a natural born citizen to be President?  The Constitution could have 
simply stated, “No person shall be eligible to the office of President of 
the United States unless he . . . be born a Citizen of the United States,” 
                                               
 25. See Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility:  An 
Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 889–90 (1988). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 27. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 163, 236. 
 28. Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-250, 48 Stat. 797, repealed by Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 301(a)(7), 66 Stat. 163, 236. 
 29. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 563 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION] (reporting the vote as 
ten-to-one against the proposal); 3 id. at 629 (describing the Hamilton plan’s 
citizenship requirements for members of Congress). 
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which was what Alexander Hamilton proposed in his alternative plan 
for a national constitution.30 
In summary, both the jus soli and congressional naturalization power 
interpretations are incomplete theories of the original meaning of 
“natural born Citizen” in Article II.  They share a disregard of the word 
“natural” and its plain invocation of natural law birthright principles 
that were foundational to the intellectual firmament of the time.  Both 
theories focus too much on specific English and U.S. naturalization 
statutes, without regard for the broader historical and political 
contexts in which the statutes were passed and the Article II 
requirement was adopted.  More generally, both existing theories do 
not account for the complexity and evolution in conceptions of 
“natural born” membership in England and the early United States.  
The right way to ascertain what “natural born Citizen” in Article II 
means is to scrutinize all the primary sources to comprehend this 
complexity and how the words reflect the intellectual climate and 
historical circumstances of the time. 
Early Americans, desirous of increasing the immigration of 
ambitious Europeans and of encouraging American merchants to go 
and trade with Europe, adopted both natural law territorial and 
parentage principles to define “natural born” citizenship in their new 
republic.  Consequently, a careful parsing of all the relevant primary 
sources indicates that the Americans who adopted the Constitution 
likely considered three categories of persons as natural born citizens:  
(1) persons born within the United States; (2) persons born outside of 
the United States to U.S. citizens in government service; and (3) 
persons born abroad to U.S. citizen fathers who had resided in the 
United States but went abroad temporarily for a private purpose, like 
merchants.  These three categories of persons tracked the two natural 
law principles ordaining membership in political communities at birth 
by territory (jus soli) and by parentage when children were born 
extraterritorially (jus sanguinis).  Importantly, however, jus sanguinis in 
the late eighteenth century was limited to the foreign-born children of 
government servants and of men; it did not encompass descent 
                                               
 30. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 629 (reprinting 
Article IX § 1 of the Hamilton Plan).  Hamilton presented his constitutional plan 
during a long speech on June 18, 1787, early in the Convention; however, he did not 
circulate a written draft then.  Hamilton did give James Madison a draft of his plan 
later at the Convention.  Id. at 619. 
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through a private citizen mother where her nationality differed from 
the father’s—a much rarer combination at the Founding than today.31 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I parses evidence from 1787 
to 1789, when the U.S. Constitution was drafted and adopted, 
regarding the original meaning of “natural born Citizen” in Article II.  
It begins by describing the relevant constitutional provisions and 
discussions at the 1787 Constitutional Convention regarding methods 
of selecting the President and eligibility requirements for Congress.  It 
then analyzes an important letter written by John Jay to George 
Washington during the Convention proposing the “natural born 
Citizen” provision.  Finally, Part I details an important, oft-quoted 
intervention by James Madison, one of the principal architects of the 
Constitution, in 1789 during a controversy over the citizenship 
eligibility of a South Carolina member of the House of Representatives.  
Part II surveys the history of natural born subjects as understood at 
English common law, including judicial decisions, Parliamentary 
statutes, and Blackstone’s monumental treatise, the Commentaries, an 
important source of original American constitutional meaning.  It then 
discusses early American treatises that referred to Blackstone and the 
English sources.  Part III recounts the treatment of natural born 
Citizenship under natural law and the law of nations.  Part IV examines 
two American statutes that use the phrase “natural born Citizen”:  a 
previously undiscovered 1784 Maryland statute, and the First 
Congress’s 1790 Naturalization Act which has been the subject of 
intense scrutiny.  A brief conclusion explores the implications of the 
recovered original meaning of “natural born Citizen” in Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution for presidential eligibility today. 
I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN”  
IN ARTICLE II 
This Part presents and analyzes all the evidence from 1787 to 1789, 
when the U.S. Constitution was adopted, relevant to ascertaining the 
                                               
 31. Among prior commentators, my position is closest to that of Edward Corwin 
(1878–1963), who also concluded that “natural born Citizen” encompassed both 
natural law principles, but without specifying the late eighteenth century natural law 
scope of jus sanguinis.  Corwin, supra note 3, at 38–39.  Corwin asserted, however, that 
Congress had broad discretion to define the scope of jus sanguinis by statute.  Id.  This 
position diverges from my claim that the Constitution when adopted between 1787 to 
1789 presumed a fixed core of natural law regarding citizenship by birth in the 
sovereign’s territory or by parentage limited to the children born outside of the United 
States to U.S. citizens serving the government or to private citizen fathers. 
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original meaning of Article II’s requirement that a person must be a 
“natural born Citizen” to be eligible to be President.  There is some 
difference of opinion about what exactly an original constitutional 
meaning is:  is it the intent of the fifty-five drafters, the understanding 
of the two thousand or so who participated in up-or-down state 
ratification conventions, or the collective views of the American people 
from 1787 to 1789 when drafting and ratification occurred?  If it is the 
last, how is it possible to reconstruct what hundreds of thousands of 
people two centuries ago understood “natural born Citizen” to mean?32  
For present purposes, I am not going to engage in this methodological 
debate33 and will presume that the original meaning we are looking for 
is a best estimate of what “natural born Citizen” meant as a 
constitutional presidential eligibility provision in 1787 to 1789, based 
on a comprehensive analysis of all relevant discussions and sources that 
Americans of the time had available to them and would likely have 
consulted. 
A. Article II’s Presidential Eligibility Conditions 
Because the U.S. Constitution is framed in a written document, any 
theory of constitutional meaning must start with its words.  Article II, 
Section 1 provides in full: 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible 
to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five 
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.34 
Article II’s three eligibility criteria of age, residence, and citizenship 
are also imposed by Article I for eligibility to be a member of Congress.  
Representatives and Senators must be twenty-five and thirty years of 
age respectively “when elected.”35  In terms of residence, all members 
of Congress must be “Inhabitant[s] of that State in which” 
                                               
 32. According to the 1790 census, there were 807,094 free white males over the 
age of sixteen in the United States.  RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN 
THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1793), 
https://www.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1790a.pdf. 
 33. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 3–22 (1996) (describing the challenges of ascertaining original meanings). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 35. Id. art. I, §§ 2–3.  Interestingly, the timing of the age requirement appears to 
differ from Article II, which would seem to require a presidential candidate to be 
thirty-five years of age to be eligible, not “when elected.” 
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(Representatives) or “for which” (Senators) “chosen.”36  There is no 
constitutional requirement of residential duration for members of 
Congress; however, Article II specifies that a person must be “fourteen 
Years a Resident within the United States” to be eligible for President.37  
With respect to citizenship, Representatives and Senators must be 
seven or nine years “a Citizen of the United States,” respectively.38  By 
contrast, the Article II citizenship requirement has two non-durational 
options:  a person must be “a natural born Citizen” or “a Citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution.”39  The 
alternative citizenship prong is often neglected because it is now 
extinct.  But, as described below, an analysis of the prong provides 
insight into the meaning of the “natural born Citizen” requirement.40 
There is one other provision of the Constitution possibly relevant to 
understanding the original meaning of “natural born Citizen.”  Article 
I, Section 8 of the Constitution lists among the powers that Congress 
“shall have” the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.”41  In the pre-constitutional period of the Articles of 
Confederation, there was no uniform law of citizenship.  Instead, each 
state determined who was a citizen, and state citizens were collectively 
“citizens of the United States.”42  The Naturalization Clause is the 
provision relied upon by advocates of the view that Congress has the 
power to make a foreign-born person a “natural born Citizen” for 
purposes of Article II by enacting a statute specifying that such a 
person is a U.S. citizen at birth, without having to take a loyalty oath or 
any other naturalization procedure. 
B. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 
The U.S. Constitution was drafted at a convention in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, from May 26 to September 17, 1787.43  The Convention 
debates are worth examining not only because they show what the 
                                               
 36. Id.  The differing prepositions likely reflected the fact that Senators were to be 
chosen “for” each state by its legislature under the original Constitution. 
 37. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 38. Id. art. I, §§ 2–3. 
 39. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 40. See infra Section I.B. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 42. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 213–24 (discussing the notions of citizenship that 
developed in the states between the Declaration of Independence and the making of 
the Constitution). 
 43. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at xi–xii. 
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delegates who drafted the Constitution were thinking (“original intent”), 
but also because the diverse positions taken likely reflected the views 
of informed citizens at large (“original public meanings”).44  After 
several weeks of discussions among all the delegates—totaling fifty-five, 
at peak attendance—a five-person “Committee of Detail,” chaired by 
John Rutledge, was elected on July 24, 1787, to prepare the first draft 
of the Constitution.45  The Committee’s marching orders included 
instructions to draft “a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications 
of . . . property and citizenship in the United States for the Executive, 
the Judiciary, and . . . Members of both branches of the Legislature.”46 
The Committee’s first draft was reported to the full Convention on 
August 6, 1787.47  Interestingly, the draft only included qualifications 
for Congress, not for the President or the Judiciary.48  It stated a 
citizenship requirement for Congress but omitted a property 
requirement and included age and residence conditions unmentioned 
in its mandate.49  The age qualifications did not spark discussion at the 
Convention.  The citizenship and “Inhabitants” requirements, however, 
were roundly debated on August 8 and 9, for reasons that illuminate 
the presidential eligibility provisions adopted four weeks later.50 
The first proposed citizenship standards for Representatives and 
Senators were three years and four years respectively.51  According to 
James Madison’s notes of the Convention, on August 8, George Mason 
of Virginia objected to the three-year citizenship threshold for 
Representatives because he did not desire “to let foreigners and 
adventurers make laws for us [and] govern us.”52  Three years of 
citizenship were “not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which 
ought to be possessed by the Representative.”53  Mason continued:  “It 
might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great 
Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the 
                                               
 44. See RAKOVE, supra note 33, at 6. 
 45. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 97–98. 
 46. Id. at 116–17.  The original proposal specified “landed property” as a 
qualification but the word “landed” was voted to be struck.  See id. (noting the 
movement and passage of striking the word “landed”); see also id. at 121–25 (providing 
James Madison’s notes regarding discussion of a property qualification). 
 47. Id. at 176–77. 
 48. See id. at 164–65, 178–79. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. at 213, 216–17, 230–31. 
 51. See id. at 164–65. 
 52. Id. at 216. 
 53. Id. 
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Legislature for insidious purposes.”54  He proposed seven years instead, 
which was agreed to by all the delegations except for Connecticut.55 
Mason’s remarks about foreign influence in government mirrored a 
speech that his fellow Virginian Madison had made two weeks earlier 
on July 25, 1787.56  The context of Madison’s speech was a heated 
discussion as to whether the Executive should be chosen by the national 
legislature, state governors, the people, or some other electors.57  The 
issue was a thorny one that was debated over several days at the 
Convention.58  On July 24, 1787, the discussion had run in favor of a 
President chosen by Congress with a long term limit to ensure that 
whomever was elected would not be beholden to the legislators who 
had picked him.59  The danger with this design, as Gouverneur Morris, 
the New York émigré who was part of Pennsylvania’s delegation, 
pointed out, was dictatorship.60  The President might “cease to be a 
man . . . unwilling to quit his exaltation,” but insulated from removal 
by “possession of the sword.”61  The leading counter-proposal was 
championed by Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts who believed allowing 
the national legislature to pick the President was “radically and 
incurably wrong.”62  Gerry proposed that state governors “with advice 
of their Councils” appoint the President.63 
It was at this point that Madison spoke firmly against Congress 
selecting the Executive in large part because it would allow “foreign 
powers” to manipulate, bribe, or influence legislators into picking the 
President they wanted.  Madison reasoned that: 
The Ministers of foreign powers would have and make use of, the 
opportunity [to] mix their intrigues & influence with the Election.  
Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of 
great moment with the great rival powers of Europe who have 
American possessions, to have at the head of our Governmt. a man 
attached to their respective politics & interests.  No pains, nor 
                                               
 54. Id.  
 55. See id. 
 56. Compare id. at 109–11 (Madison’s remarks), with id. at 216, 218 (Mason’s remarks). 
 57. Id. at 95, 98–101, 103, 105, 108–09, 115, 118–19. 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. at 99–104. 
 60. Id. at 103–04. 
 61. Id. at 105. 
 62. Id. at 109. 
 63. Id. 
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perhaps expence, will be spared, to gain from the Legislature an 
appointmt. favorable to their wishes.64 
Madison’s point about the national legislature’s vulnerability to 
foreign influence in selecting a President resonated with diverse 
delegates.  Mason, for instance, said he “preferred on the whole” 
Congress picking the President, but that “[c]andor obliged him to 
admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as had been 
suggested.  This was the most serious objection with him that had been 
urged.”65  Pierce Butler of South Carolina opined:  “The two great evils 
to be avoided are cabal at home, & influence from abroad.  It will be 
difficult to avoid either if the Election be made by the Natl 
Legislature.”66  Hugh Williamson of North Carolina was also “sensible 
that strong objections lay agst an election of the Executive by the 
Legislature, and that it opened a door for foreign influence.”67 
In sum, the convention debates on presidential selection indicate a 
broad consensus that Congress ought not to select the President 
directly because it was too vulnerable to foreign influence.68  The 
debate occurred a month before the “natural born Citizen” language 
for presidential eligibility was adopted.  Why then, should the 
Constitution be interpreted to give Congress a free hand in defining 
who is a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be President?  If early 
Americans feared that a powerful foreign state like Great Britain might 
influence Congress to select the President it wanted, why would they 
not have feared that Congress might enact a statute making any person 
                                               
 64. Id.  Madison saw the same problem with appointment by state governors, 
although it would be more diffuse:  “An appointment by the State Executives, was 
liable . . . to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they could & would be 
courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, by their partizans, and by the Ministers 
of foreign powers.”  Id. at 110. 
 65. Id. at 112. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 113.  A month later, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina proposed a new 
provision, now Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 (with only minor revisions from Pinckney’s 
suggestion), also to protect against foreign influence of national officials which the 
delegates unanimously adopted, apparently without discussion:  “No person holding 
any office of profit or trust under the [United States], shall without the consent of the 
Legislature, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, 
from any King, Prince or foreign State.”  Id. at 389.  As Edmund Randolph explained 
at the Virginia ratifying convention:  “It was thought proper, in order to exclude 
corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving or 
holding any emoluments from foreign states.”  3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 327. 
 68. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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to be born in England eligible to be President?  Those who believe that 
Congress has power to say who is a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be 
President under the Naturalization Clause have pointed to no 
evidence from the time when the Constitution was adopted to support 
their theory.  This is unsurprising.  The Article I Naturalization Clause 
takes away the states’ power to determine who can be a citizen of the 
United States and gives it to Congress for uniformity’s sake.  It does not 
have anything to do with giving Congress the power to set citizenship 
eligibility conditions for the Presidency.  Only Article II of the 
Constitution says who can be President; it would be a violation of the 
Constitution’s separation of powers if Congress could do so by 
enacting a statute under its Article I powers. 
Let us return, then, to the constitutional convention debates about 
congressional citizenship requirements to see how they illuminate the 
constitutional rule of presidential citizenship.  On August 8, 1787, 
Mason’s motion to increase citizenship rules for Representatives from 
three to seven years passed.69  The next day, there was extensive 
discussion of a new proposal introduced by Gouverneur Morris to raise 
the citizenship requirement for Senators from four to fourteen years.70  
An increase seemed called for, given that the citizenship duration for 
the lower chamber of Congress now stood at seven years.71  To support 
his motion, Morris pointed to the “danger of admitting strangers into 
our public Councils.”72  Charles Pinckney added that there was 
“peculiar danger and impropriety” in permitting members with 
“foreign attachments” into the Senate given its foreign affairs powers.73  
George Mason “highly approved” of Morris’s motion and opined that 
“[w]ere it not that many not natives of this Country had acquired great 
merit during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility 
into the Senate, to natives.”74  Pierce Butler, Pinckney’s fellow South 
Carolinian, also favored a long citizenship condition, on the view that 
“foreigners . . . bring with them, not only attachments to other 
Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours that in every point 
                                               
 69. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 213, 216–17. 
 70. Id. at 235. 
 71. See id. at 239 (statement of John Rutledge) (explaining that the Senate 
citizenship requirement should be longer than the citizenship cut-off for the House of 
Representatives because the Senate was a more powerful body). 
 72. Id. at 235. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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of view they are dangerous . . . .  He mentioned the great strictness 
observed in Great Britain on this subject.”75 
Prominent members of the Convention objected to Morris’s 
proposal.  Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, future Chief Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, thought it would “discourag[e] meritorious 
aliens from emigrating to this Country.”76  Benjamin Franklin of 
Pennsylvania was of similar mind, noting that it looked “illiberal” and 
that “we have many good Friends in Engld. & other parts of Europe” 
who “ought not to be excluded” from the possibility of high office as 
an inducement to immigrate.77 
We found in the Course of the Revolution, that many strangers 
served us faithfully—and that many natives took part agst. their 
Country.  When foreigners after looking about for some other 
Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference 
to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our 
confidence & affection.78 
Future first U.S. Attorney General Edmund Randolph of Virginia 
“could never agree” to a proposal “disabling” foreigners for fourteen 
years from “participat[ion] in the public honours.”79  He “reminded 
the Convention of the language held by our patriots during the 
Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our American 
Constitutions.  Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes among 
us under the faith of these invitations.”80  Future Supreme Court Justice 
James Wilson, who had emigrated from Scotland to Pennsylvania in his 
twenties, “rose with feelings,” confessed to “not being a native,” and 
pointed out that “if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued,” 
he would be “incapacitated from holding a place under the very 
Constitution which he had shared in the trust of making.”81 
James Madison also spoke against increasing the constitutional U.S. 
citizenship requirement for Senators from four to fourteen years.  He 
began by stating he “was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; 
but could never agree to the proposed amendment.”82  His next points 
                                               
 75. Id. at 236. 
 76. Id. at 235. 
 77. Id. at 243. 
 78. Id. at 236–37. 
 79. Id. at 237. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 235. 
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are highly significant to the current debate about the original meaning 
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause. 
[A]ny restriction . . . in the Constitution [is] unnecessary and 
improper. unnecessary; because the Natl. Legislre. is to have the 
right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix 
different periods of residence as conditions of enjoying different 
privileges of Citizenship:  Improper:  because it will give a tincture 
of illiberality to the Constitution:  because it will put it out of the 
power of the Natl Legislature even by special acts of naturalization 
to confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers . . . .83 
Madison was clearly proposing that the citizenship requirements for 
Senators be left to future Congresses under what would become their 
Article I naturalization powers.  This is precisely the view championed 
by those who favor an interpretation of the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause as giving Congress discretion to determine presidential 
eligibility by statutes on the books at the time of birth like Akhil Amar, 
Paul Clement, Neal Katyal, and Michael Ramsey.84  The other delegates 
decisively rejected Madison’s suggestion of leaving citizenship 
conditions for eligibility to office up to Congress in favor of hard-wiring 
a term-of-years requirement.  Morris, for instance, spoke directly 
against Madison’s idea because “[t]here was no knowing what 
Legislatures would do.”85  Morris’s motion to increase the citizenship 
requirement from four to fourteen years failed by a vote of four states 
to seven; he then moved for thirteen years which failed by the same 
vote.86  Pinckney moved for ten years which also failed four-to-seven.87  
Randolph proposed nine years as a compromise, which was finally 
accepted by a vote of six-to-four.88 
The next day, August 10, 1787, James Wilson moved to reconsider 
the citizenship requirement for the House of Representatives and 
prevailed by a narrow six-to-five vote.89  The debates to reconsider took 
                                               
 83. Id. at 235–36.  Madison’s position here is admittedly somewhat at odds with his 
position against direct election of the President by Congress for fear of foreign influence. 
 84. See Amar, supra note 24 (arguing that Congress has the authority to interpret 
the presidential eligibility rules under the Constitution); see also Ramsey, supra note 24, 
(manuscript at 33–34) (asserting that the Naturalization Clause permits Congress to 
define who is a “natural born Citizen” eligible to be President because the British 
Parliament passed statutes defining “natural born subjects”). 
 85. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 238. 
 86. See id. at 238–39. 
 87. See id. at 239. 
 88. One state’s delegates were evenly divided.  See id. 
 89. Id. at 251. 
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place three days later on August 13, 1787.90  Wilson and Randolph from 
Virginia proposed to decrease it to four years from the seven years 
Mason had successfully urged.91  Gerry from Massachusetts was 
vehemently opposed and asserted that eligibility should be exclusively 
“confined to Natives”92: 
Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no 
expence to influence them.  Persons having foreign attachments will 
be sent among us & insinuated into our councils, in order to be 
made instruments for their purposes.  Every one knows the vast sums 
laid out in Europe for secret services—He was not singular in these 
ideas.  A great many of the most influential men in Massts. reasoned 
in the same manner.93 
Williamson of North Carolina was of similar sentiment and urged an 
upward revision “to insert [nine] years instead of seven.”94 
It was at this point that Alexander Hamilton of New York, himself a 
juvenile emigrant born in the British Crown possession of Nevis in the 
West Indies, intervened.  While conceding the “possible danger” of 
foreign influence, he asserted that “the advantage of encouraging 
foreigners was obvious & admitted”95: 
Persons in Europe of moderate fortunes will be fond of coming here 
where they will be on a level with the first Citizens.  He moved that 
the section be so altered as to require merely Citizenship & 
inhabitancy.  The right of determining the rule of naturalization will 
then leave a discretion to the Legislature on this subject which will 
answer every purpose.96 
James Madison seconded Hamilton’s motion, which was 
unsurprising since it was the same idea Madison himself had suggested 
as to the Senate citizenship requirements four days earlier on August 
9, 1787.97  He continued: 
There was a possible danger he admitted that men with foreign 
predilections might obtain appointments but it was by no means 
probable that it would in any dangerous degree.  For the same 
                                               
 90. Id. at 267. 
 91. Id. at 268.  Madison’s notes for August 10 reported that Wilson had moved for 
a reduction back to the original requirement of three years.  See id. at 251.  The Journal 
reported the motion and the vote but not the specifics.  See id. at 247. 
 92. Id. at 268. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
 97. Id.; see supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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reason that they would be attached to their native Country, our own 
people wd. prefer natives of this Country to them.  Experience 
proved this to be the case.  Instances were rare of a foreigner being 
elected by the people within any short space after his coming among 
us—If bribery was to be practised by foreign powers, it would not be 
attempted among the electors, but among the elected; and among 
natives having full Confidence of the people not among strangers 
who would be regarded with a jealous eye.98 
Wilson withdrew his own separate motion for three years and 
supported Hamilton’s motion for Congress to set citizenship 
conditions, offering evidence from Pennsylvania.99  “He remarked that 
almost all the Genl. officers of [the Pennsylvania militia] were foreigners.  
And no complaint had ever been made against their fidelity or merit.  
Three of her deputies to the Convention (Mr. R. Morris, Mr. 
Fitzsimmons & himself) were also not natives.”100  Pierce Butler of 
South Carolina, however, remained “strenuous” against “admitting 
foreigners into our public Councils.”101  His sentiments appeared more 
in line with the majority view.  In fact, Hamilton’s motion to leave 
congressional citizenship requirements to Congress under its 
Naturalization Clause power failed by a vote of four (Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia) in favor and seven against.102 
The August 13, 1787, failure of Alexander Hamilton’s motion is a 
highly significant piece of evidence that other commentators on the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause have neglected.  Like Madison on August 
9, Hamilton proposed to “leave a discretion to the Legislature” to 
decide the “rule of naturalization” for Representatives pursuant to 
Congress’s Article I naturalization power.103  Unlike Madison, 
Hamilton actually put the proposal to a vote, where it was rejected by 
a vote of seven-states-to-four.104  True, it was a discussion of the 
constitutional citizenship requirements for Congress, not President.  
But, if early Americans were so concerned about leaving discretion to 
Congress on citizenship standards for the legislative branch, there 
would have been an even stronger case for not doing so with respect 
                                               
 98. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 268–69. 
 99. Id. at 269. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  Williamson’s motion to increase the requirement to nine years and Wilson’s 
renewed motion to decrease it to four years also failed, both by three-to-eight votes. 
 103. Id. at 268. 
 104. Id. at 269. 
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to the chief executive, who would be commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces, and whose qualifications and powers were separately set forth 
in Article II of the Constitution. 
After Hamilton’s motion to leave citizenship standards for the 
Legislative Branch to Congress under its naturalization power was 
rejected, Gouverneur Morris proposed a “proviso” exempting “any 
person now a Citizen” from the requirement of seven years of 
citizenship.105  John Mercer of Maryland seconded the motion in order 
to prevent “disfranchisement” of foreigners who had become citizens 
believing they were to be “level in all respects with natives.”106  Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut rejoined that the individual states made such 
foreigners citizens, not the United States, which “have not invited 
foreigners nor pledged their faith that they should enjoy equal 
privileges with native Citizens” and were “therefore . . . at liberty to 
make any discriminations they may judge requisite.”107  Madison 
vehemently disagreed with Sherman’s suggestion that the new United 
States would owe no obligation undertaken by the states, decrying it as 
a “subt[lety] by which every national engagement might be evaded,” 
including public debts and foreign treaties.108 
The proviso was defeated by a five-to-six vote, for reasons that remain 
unclear.109  It may have been because, as Morris pointed out, the 
carveout was only justified for foreigners who were citizens when the 
new republic was founded.  Consequently, it would have had a brief 
lifespan and might have seemed unnecessary, since the minimum age 
to be a Representative was only twenty-five years of age.110  But, as we 
shall see, the concept of an exception for foreigners who were already 
citizens of the states when they adopted the Constitution between 1787 
and 1789 would reappear in Article II regarding the Presidency, which 
has a minimum age of thirty-five years.111 
Although the Committee of Detail had been tasked to draft 
qualifications for all three branches, its draft only contained requirements 
for the legislative.112  Accordingly, Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved 
on August 20, 1787, to instruct the Committee “to report proper 
                                               
 105. Id. at 270. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 272. 
 110. See id. at 271. 
 111. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 112. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 177–89. 
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qualifications for the President.”113  The Committee presented its first 
draft of what would become Article II’s presidential eligibility provision 
on August 22, as part of a list of “additions” to the draft constitution it 
had delivered on August 6.114  The draft provision stated:  “[H]e shall 
be of the age of thirty five years, and a Citizen of the United States, and 
shall have been an Inhabitant thereof for Twenty one years.”115 
As the Convention deliberated on other more pressing aspects of the 
draft constitution, the Committee of Detail’s presidential eligibility 
draft provision was referred on August 31, 1787, to a “Committee of 
Eleven” (also known as the “Committee on Postponed Matters”)116 
composed of members from each of the states represented at the 
Convention including James Madison as the member from Virginia.117  
On September 4, this Committee reported the first version of the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause to the Convention at large: 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the U. S. at 
the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the 
office of President:  nor shall any Person be elected to that office, 
who shall be under the age of 35 years, and who has not been in the 
whole, at least 14 years a resident within the U. S.118 
                                               
 113. Id. at 344.  Interestingly, no one moved for eligibility provisions for the judicial 
branch, despite their mention in the original guidance to the Committee of Detail, 
and so there are none in Article III. 
 114. Id. at 366–68. 
 115. Id. at 367. 
 116. See id. at 367, 473 (noting that the Convention moved forward without voting on 
the proposed presidential eligibility provision; therefore, it was postponed by default). 
 117. See id. at 473.  This was the third “Committee of Eleven” composed of members 
representing each attending State.  The first Committee had been proposed and 
appointed on July 2, 1787, to tackle the thorny question of equal representation of the 
States in the Senate.  See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 516.  
The second Committee of Eleven had been proposed and appointed on August 25 to 
deal with uniform customs duties and fees.  2 id. at 410. 
 118. Id. at 494.  The notes of Pierce Butler, South Carolina’s member on the third 
Committee of Eleven, present a slightly different version, which may have been a 
working draft in committee: 
“No Person shall be eligible to the Office of President who shall not have 
arrived at the Age of 30 Years; neither shall any person so eligible who shall 
not be a natural born Citizen of the United States, excepting those who now 
are or at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution shall be a Citizen of the 
said States any one of whom may be President, provided that at the time of his 
Election He shall have been an Inhabitant for fourteen Years.” 
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
253 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987). 
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This provision was approved without objection or discussion on 
September 7, 1787.119  It was slightly modified to the present version by 
a five-person Committee of Style and Arrangement (on which Madison 
also served) appointed on September 8 that produced the final draft 
on September 12.120 
The August 22 first draft of the presidential eligibility provision 
differed from the September 12 final version of Article II in three 
important respects.  First, the simple requirement of citizenship was 
replaced by a requirement of being a “natural born Citizen, or a Citizen 
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of [the] Constitution” 
(i.e., 1787 to 1789).121  Second, the qualification of being an 
“Inhabitant” of the United States was changed to one of being a 
“Resident within the United States.”122  Third, the prior requirement 
of twenty-one years as an “Inhabitant” was reduced to fourteen years as 
a “Resident.”123  We shall see below what happened between August 
31—the date that the presidential eligibility provision was sent to the 
Committee on Postponed Matters—and September 4—the date on 
which the first version of the Natural Born Citizen Clause was 
introduced for discussion. 
The thorough dissection above of the convention debates of July 25 
and August 8, 9, 10, and 13, 1787, yields valuable insights about two of 
these changes and some circumstantial evidence about the third and 
most important—the incorporation of the “natural born Citizen” 
requirement.  First, the debates of August 9 confirm the commonsense 
impression that the substitution of “Resident” for “Inhabitant” was 
intended to mandate a greater level of presence in the United States, 
                                               
 119. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 536. 
 120. Again, the final version stated: 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at 
the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of 
President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident 
within the United States. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.  None of the changes seem substantive—possibly, the final 
version might be construed as requiring fourteen years of continuous residence as 
opposed to “in the whole.” 
 121. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added), with 2 RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 367 (August 22 draft presidential eligibility provision). 
 122. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, with 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 367. 
 123. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, with 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 367. 
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akin to an intent to stay there permanently.  Mere presence for 
fourteen years would not suffice.  The longer quantitative requirement 
of twenty-one years as an “Inhabitant” was exchanged for a deeper 
qualitative durational threshold of fourteen years as a “Resident.” 
Second, the August 13, 1787, debate about Morris’s proviso for 
foreigners who were currently citizens foreshadows Article II’s 
provision “grandfathering” any person who was a “Citizen of the 
United States” at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.124  Since 
there was no uniform national citizenship standard under the pre-
constitutional Articles of Confederation, the reference must be 
construed as a requirement that any person who was a citizen of one 
of the United States was eligible to be President.125  This alternative 
criterion for presidential eligibility is now extinct, but its mere 
existence is highly significant.  It is absolute:  there is no requirement 
of citizenship duration, residence, or inhabitation.  A person need not 
have been a citizen of one of the United States at birth; thus, Alexander 
Hamilton, for instance, would plainly have been eligible.  Indeed, a 
person could have been a citizen for less than a year and still have 
qualified to be President, including foreigners who had gained 
citizenship by coming to fight in the Revolutionary War. 
Why was it viewed as a sufficient qualification to be President to have 
been a citizen at the creation of the country?  Its rationale seems plain 
enough.  The only plausible explanation is a belief that participation 
in forming the new political community of the United States as a 
“Citizen” gave a person the right to run to lead it.  Joseph Story 
reasoned that the one-time exception emerged “out of respect to those 
distinguished revolutionary patriots who were born in a foreign land, 
and yet had entitled themselves to high honours in their adopted 
country.  A positive exclusion of them from the office would have been 
unjust to their merits and painful to their sensibilities.”126  It is a 
powerful statement about the privileges and rights of “citizenship” in 
the new Republic:  in their prior lives as “subjects” of the British King, 
no American could aspire to be the head of state (i.e., the king or 
queen).127  This is one key reason why it is dangerous to rely uncritically 
on usages of “natural born subject” in English common law for insight 
                                               
 124. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 125. See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 213–24 (summarizing the states’ varying 
naturalization requirements under the Articles of Confederation). 
 126. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1479 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co., 5th ed. 1994) (1891). 
 127. See COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 27–29. 
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into the meaning of “natural born Citizen” as a constitutional 
requirement to be the U.S. President.  Semantic similarities should not 
override a fundamental difference in the two political orders. 
A third clue gained from scrutinizing the debates of congressional 
citizenship eligibility was the presence of a broad consensus that the 
purpose for the requirements was a fear of foreign influence on the 
new federal government.  As Story explained, echoing the concerns 
voiced by Constitutional Convention delegates regarding the methods 
of selecting the President and congressional citizenship requirements: 
[T]he general propriety of the exclusion of foreigners, in common 
cases, will scarcely be doubted by any sound statesman.  It cuts off all 
chances for ambitious foreigners, who might otherwise be intriguing 
for the office; and interposes a barrier against those corrupt interferences 
of foreign governments in executive elections, which have inflicted the 
most serious evils upon the elective monarchies of Europe.  Germany, 
Poland, and even the Pontificate of Rome, are sad, but instructive 
examples of the enduring mischiefs arising from this source.128 
This concern about foreign influence was balanced against the 
strong desire to encourage Europeans to emigrate to the United States, 
particularly men of merit who were hospitable to the new republic’s 
political ideals.129  But why, then, did the delegates not simply follow 
the pattern of the congressional provisions and add a longer term of 
years, say, fourteen years for the President, as compared to seven years 
for Representatives and nine years for Senators?  Such an option may 
have seemed impractical because a “citizen of the United States” only 
came into being upon declaration of independence from Great Britain 
on July 4, 1776.130  That was just eleven years before the Convention, 
and so using any duration longer than the nine years for Senators was 
problematic.  But, as we shall see, there is persuasive evidence that the 
                                               
 128. See Story, supra note 126, § 1479. 
 129. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 235 (noting the 
concern of Convention members that increasing certain residency requirements 
would discourage immigration). 
 130. See DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE 
CHARACTER AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (Charleston 1789) 
(“This accounts for the use of the word resident in that paragraph of the new 
constitution, which describes the qualifications of the president of the United States.  
The Senators must be citizens nine years, and the representatives seven years; but it is 
not said, that the president must be a citizen for fourteen years.  The thing was 
impossible, for independence was then not quite twelve years declared; therefore the 
word resident was introduced in order to comprehend time before the declaration of 
independence.”). 
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Article II phrase “natural born Citizen” was not arrived at by a process 
of elimination, but rather, affirmatively originated by a letter written 
by John Jay in late July 1787 to George Washington at the 
Constitutional Convention. 
C. Jay Letter of July 25, 1787 
At the time of the Convention, John Jay, who had led the 
negotiations on the Peace Treaty with Great Britain, was the 
Continental Congress’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs in his native New 
York.131  On July 22, 1787, a couple days before the Convention at large 
in Philadelphia adjourned to entrust the Committee of Detail with the 
task of coming up with the first draft of the Constitution, Washington 
wrote a letter for Commodore John Paul Jones of the Continental Navy 
to carry to France.132  He mailed the letter to Jay in New York with a 
cover note for Jay to deliver it to Jones, who was awaiting transport 
there.133  Jay wrote a brief, three-sentence note to Washington dated 
July 25, 1787, to acknowledge receipt of the letter and to explain why 
Jones had not shipped out right away.  The note also offered 
Washington a “hint.” 
Dear Sir 
I was this morning honored with your Excellency’s Favor of the 
22d Inst:  & immediately delivered the Letter it enclosed to 
Commodore Jones, who being detained by Business, did not go in 
the french Packet, which sailed Yesterday. 
Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to 
provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the 
administration of our national Government, and to declare 
expressly that the Command in chief of the american army shall not 
be given to, nor devolved on, any but a natural born Citizen.134 
                                               
 131. Jay, John, (1745–1829), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=J000065 (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). 
 132. See Letter from George Washington to John Paul Jones (July 22, 1787), in 5 
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, CONFEDERATION SERIES, 1 FEBRUARY 1787–31 
DECEMBER 1787 268 (W. W. Abbot ed., 1997). 
 133. “Will you permit me to give you the trouble of the inclosed for Commodore 
Jones—It is at his request I do it—I offer best wish to Mrs Jay and with every sentiments 
of esteem and regard. I have the honor to be Dr Sir Yr very Affe. Serva[n]t G. 
Washington.”  Id. at 268 n.2 (alteration in original). 
 134. Letter from John Jay to George Washington (July 25, 1787), in 5 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, CONFEDERATION SERIES, 1 FEBRUARY 1787–31 DECEMBER 1787, 
supra note 132, at 271–72. 
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Washington did not write back for several weeks.  When he did reply, 
he wrote an equally brief note to Jay from Philadelphia dated 
September 2, 1787, which thanked him for the “hints contained in 
your letter.”135 
Dear Sir, 
I avail myself of the polite assurance of your last, to trouble you 
with the enclosed.  If the Commodore should have left New York, 
you would oblige me by forwarding it. 
. . . . 
I thank you for the hints contained in your letter, and with best 
wishes for Mrs Jay, and great affection for yourself I am—Dear Sir Yr 
Most Obedt Servt.136 
The September 2, 1787, date of Washington’s reply to Jay supports a 
strong inference that Washington had passed Jay’s “hint” to others at 
the Convention.137  Washington was unanimously voted President of 
the Convention at its start and said very little during it138—surely, 
anything he suggested would have had an effect.  And, as noted above, 
the Committee of Detail’s draft presented to the Convention on 
August 22, 1787, had not included the phrase “natural born Citizen.”  
The draft constitution had been referred to the third Committee of 
Eleven on August 31, 1787, on which Madison served as the Virginia 
representative.139  Madison was close to Washington, a fellow Virginian, 
and had been instrumental in persuading Washington to attend the 
Convention.140  The Committee reported its version of the presidential 
eligibility provision with “natural born Citizen” to the Convention at 
large on September 4, 1787, exactly two days after the date of 
Washington’s reply to Jay.141 
                                               
 135. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Sept. 2, 1787), in 5 THE PAPERS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, CONFEDERATION SERIES, 1 FEBRUARY 1787–31 DECEMBER 1787, 
supra note 132, at 208. 
 136. Id. at 207–08. 
 137. It is also possible that Jay wrote to others at the Convention, although I was 
unable to find any other relevant letters in Jay’s papers. 
 138. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 3. 
 139. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 473. 
 140. See William P. Kladky, Constitutional Convention, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT 
VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/constitutional-
convention (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (explaining that Washington was worried that 
his attendance would be perceived as a power play, but that Madison and General 
Henry Knox persuaded him to attend the Convention). 
 141. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 493–94 (reporting 
the presentation of the draft, including the Natural Born Citizen Clause). 
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Given these striking coincidences of timing, scholars have coalesced 
around the view that Jay’s letter was the smoking-gun source of the use 
of “natural born Citizen” in Article II.  What was Jay’s reason for writing 
the letter to Washington, presumptively shared by the Constitution’s 
framers, ratifiers, and the public at large?  The conventional view touts 
the concern about foreign influence in domestic American politics 
that had fueled the Convention debates about congressional 
citizenship requirements:  the fear that a European pretender would 
become President and import monarchy as the political order of the 
new United States.  As Akhil Amar tartly put it, “Foreign-born princes 
might be good enough to rule in the Old World but should be kept 
out of the New World order—or at least the New World presidency.”142  
The Congressional Research Service summarized the standard 
thinking this way in 2011: 
The apparent purposes . . . were thus to assure the requisite fealty 
and allegiance to the nation from the person to be the chief 
executive of the United States, and to prevent wealthy foreign 
citizens, and particularly wealthy foreign royalty and their relatives, 
from coming to the United States, becoming naturalized citizens, 
and then scheming and buying their way into the Presidency or 
creating an American monarchy.143 
Scholars have surmised that Prince Frederick Augustus of Great 
Britain, the second son of George III and Duke of York and Albany, 
and Prince Henry of Prussia, one of the younger sons of King Frederick 
William I of Prussia, may have been the “foreign born princes” that 
people had in mind.144  Charles Thach fingered a third suspect, 
asserting “there can be little doubt” it was Baron Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Steuben “whom Jay had in mind when he penned these words,” 
given von Steuben’s “sympathies” for Shays’ Rebellion and “suspected 
dealings with Prince Henry.”145 
But the conventional view of protecting against an “Old World” 
European “creating an American monarchy,” as asserted by the 
                                               
 142. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 165 (2005). 
 143. MASKELL, supra note 3, at 8. 
 144. Id. at 7. 
 145. THACH, supra note 3, at 137.  Despite Thach’s surmise about Jay’s intent, von 
Steuben in fact was likely eligible, as he appears to have been granted citizenship in at 
least two states (New Jersey and New York) and possibly a third (Pennsylvania) before 
the adoption of the Constitution.  See infra note 350 and accompanying text.  Thus, 
even if he was not a “natural born Citizen,” he would be eligible for President by virtue 
of having been a citizen when the Constitution was adopted.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1, cl. 5. 
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Congressional Research Service report and Amar, is only half the story.  
Nor are the usual suspects credible.  True, Jay’s letter advised “a strong 
check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our 
national Government.”146  Jay’s words mirrored Mason’s remarks 
against letting “foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern 
us” that resulted in the enhanced seven- and nine-year citizenship 
requirements for Congress.147  But, either the original draft’s twenty-
one-year “Inhabitant” requirement or the adopted fourteen-year 
“Resident” requirement would have addressed this issue of European 
princes with no connection to the United States becoming President.  
Why, then, the additional felt need for a “natural born Citizen”? 
The answer begins with the observation that Jay’s hint specifically 
addressed the President’s role as military commander, not as head of 
state or chief executive of the domestic political order.  To wit, he 
advised that the Constitution ought “to declare expressly that the 
Command in chief of the american army shall not be given to, nor 
devolved on, any but a natural born Citizen.”148  But why was it so 
important to him that the army not fall into the hands of someone who 
was not a natural born citizen?  Whom did Jay have in mind? 
I believe that Jay was thinking not about Prince Frederick William, 
Prince Henry, or Baron von Steuben, but rather about the Marquis de 
Lafayette.  Jay wrote to Washington on July 25, 1787, to tell him he had 
passed on Washington’s letter for John Paul Jones to take to France.  If 
Jay did not know for sure, then he must have guessed that the likely 
recipient of this letter was Lafayette, Washington’s beloved former 
aide-de-camp.  Two letters that Washington wrote Lafayette during the 
Constitutional Convention survive:  one dated June 6, 1787,149 and the 
other dated August 15, 1787.150  Washington also wrote one letter to 
                                               
 146. Letter from John Jay to George Washington, supra note 134, at 271–72. 
 147. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 216 (arguing that three 
years of citizenship was not enough to ensure knowledge of local customs and problems). 
 148. Letter from John Jay to George Washington, supra note 134, at 271–72. 
 149. See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 29, at 34. 
 150. Id. at 69. 
Altho’ the business of the Fœderal Convention is not yet clos’d, nor I, thereby, 
enabled to give you an account of its proceedings; yet, the opportunity 
afforded by Commodore Paul Jones’ Return to France is too favourable for 
me to omit informing you, that the present expectation of the members is, 
that it will end about the first of next month; when, or as soon after as it shall 
be in my power, I will communicate the result of our long deliberation to you. 
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Thomas Jefferson, the American Minister to France dated May 30, 
1787, early in the Convention.151  Even if Jay saw Jefferson as a possible 
recipient of Washington’s letter, he would likely have thought of Lafayette 
anyway; Jefferson was widely known to have become close to Lafayette, 
whose republican ambitions for France he heartily supported.152 
Like the two foreign princes and the baron, Lafayette had military 
experience.153  But, unlike the princes, Lafayette was wildly popular 
among the American people and their senior leaders, most notably 
George Washington himself.154  The Frenchman had named his son 
George Washington.155  Lafayette had heroically led actual elements of 
the “American army” in battle and was personally instrumental in the 
critical American victory at Yorktown.156  Jay himself, of French-
Huguenot descent, was fond of Lafayette;157 leading Americans like 
Jefferson feared for the Frenchman’s safety given his leadership in the 
pro-democracy movement in France.158  Indeed, Jay expressed relief 
that some American states had granted Lafayette land in case he were 
exiled for his political agitation.159  In sum, Lafayette was a person who 
                                               
Id.  Farrand reports the date of this letter as August 15, 1787, but its reference to 
“Jones’ Return to France” suggests that it may have been the original letter Washington 
had sent to Jay on July 22, 1787, which triggered Jay’s momentous reply note. 
 151. Id. at 31.  “The business of this convention is as yet too much in embryo to 
form any opinion of the conclusion.”  Id. 
 152. See Thomas Jefferson:  A Revolutionary World, LIBR. CONGRESS, 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/jeffworld.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) 
(explaining that Jefferson became a galvanizing figure for the French Revolution and 
let Lafayette-led rebels use his French home as a meeting point). 
 153. See Lloyd S. Kramer, America’s Lafayette and Lafayette’s America:  A European and 
the American Revolution, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 228, 229 (1981) (noting that Lafayette’s 
“presence in the Continental army lent an aura of legitimacy and of European support 
to the American struggle”). 
 154. See id. at 229 (asserting that Washington’s acceptance, praise, and support of 
Lafayette contributed to his unprecedented popularity among Americans). 
 155. JAMES R. GAINES, FOR LIBERTY AND GLORY:  WASHINGTON, LAFAYETTE, AND THEIR 
REVOLUTIONS 8 (2007). 
 156. Kramer, supra note 153, at 240 (“Lafayette had closed off Cornwallis’s escape 
from Yorktown, thereby assuring the military victory that achieved the war’s most 
important political goal.”). 
 157. See WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY:  FOUNDING FATHER 176 (2005) (“Jay disliked the French 
government, but he liked many individual Frenchmen, notably the Marquis de Lafayette.”). 
 158. See GAINES, supra note 155, at 214, 224, 339 (noting that Jefferson’s fear for 
Lafayette’s safety later proved to be justified since Lafayette was imprisoned for his role 
in the French Revolution). 
 159. See id. at 214 (highlighting Jefferson’s desire for the states to make an honorary 
gift of land to Lafayette because “the day might be coming ‘when it might serve as an 
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might actually be elected President of the United States, and thus its 
military chieftain, without the need for foreign intrigue or bribes. 
I do not mean to suggest that Jay was proposing a constitutional bar 
to presidential eligibility specifically to block Lafayette.  Rather, I 
believe that what Jay feared was the possibility of the election to the 
U.S. Presidency of someone like Lafayette with strong sympathies with 
the republican cause in Europe who would then seek to deploy 
American armies in aid of revolutionary war there.  The concern was 
certainly not far-fetched.  After the French Revolution the following 
year, there was great support for coming to revolutionary France’s 
military assistance.160  Some, like Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, 
believed that the United States was legally obligated to assist 
revolutionary France because of the U.S.-French alliance treaty.161  In 
other words, there were two fundamental, inter-related concerns 
animating the Natural Born Citizen Clause:  not only preventing 
European intervention in American domestic politics, but also 
preventing American military intervention in European domestic 
politics.  Limiting the Presidency to persons with “natural born” loyalty 
exclusively to the United States was a way to mitigate conflicting 
loyalties that might entangle the new nation in European wars. 
D. James Madison and the 1789 Citizenship Controversy  
in the First Congress 
One other key piece of evidence involving James Madison (Jay’s co-
author of The Federalist) regarding the original meaning of the Natural 
Born Citizen Clause comes from Madison’s speech in the First Congress 
defending the House of Representative’s decision in an early challenge 
to the citizenship of one of its members.  On April 29, 1789, in the 
inaugural session of Congress, a specially empaneled House 
Committee on Elections, rendered a decision in Ramsay v. Smith after 
                                               
useful asylum for him’” and the United States may become “a safe residence for him” 
(quoting Thomas Jefferson)). 
 160. See Office of the Historian, The United States and the French Revolution, 1789–
1799, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/french-rev (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2017) (contrasting the pro-French republican group in Washington’s 
Cabinet led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson with the pro-neutrality supporters 
led by Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton). 
 161. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Treaties with Franch, in 25 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 JANUARY–10 MAY 1793 608–19 (John Catanzariti ed., 1992). 
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reviewing evidence and hearing witnesses.162  The case involved a 
challenge to the election of William Loughton Smith to the House as 
a Representative from South Carolina.163  The challenger was David 
Ramsay, a South Carolina physician, delegate to the Continental Congress 
and state legislature, and a historian of repute who authored a short 
“dissertation” about citizenship.164  Ramsay asserted that Smith was not 
a citizen of the United States for seven years, as required by Article I.165 
The facts supported Ramsay’s claim.  Smith was born in 1758 in 
Charleston, South Carolina, then a British colony.166  His family, a 
respected clan of planters with deep roots in the colony, sent him to 
schools in England from 1770 to 1774.167  He subsequently studied law 
at the Middle Temple in London in 1774 and also studied in Geneva 
from 1774 to 1778.168  He was a seventeen-year-old student in Geneva 
when the United States declared independence in 1776.169  Smith did 
not return to South Carolina until after the war in November 1783 at 
the age of twenty-four, whereupon he began a law practice and entered 
local politics.170  He was elected to Congress as a Federalist and began 
his two-year term in the House of Representatives on March 4, 1789.171  
At the time of his election, Smith had been a citizen of South Carolina 
and then of the United States for between five and six years.172  But, he 
had not been a citizen for the requisite seven years, unless he had 
somehow been a “citizen of the United States” for at least one of the 
seven years he had been abroad from 1776, when the United States 
declared its independence, to 1783, when he returned to South 
Carolina.173  Because Smith’s parents had apparently been Loyalists, 
they had presumptively been loyal British subjects during that time—
                                               
 162. Ramsay v. Smith (1789), reprinted in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN 
CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE 23 (M. St. Clair Clarke & David A. 
Hall eds., 1834). 
 163. Id. at 23. 
 164. See generally RAMSAY, supra note 130. 
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THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE, supra note 162, at 23. 
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an allegiance that could plausibly be imputed to their minor children.174  
It was by no means easy to make the case that Smith had in fact been a 
citizen of the United States for his time abroad as a minor during the war. 
Nevertheless, the Committee on Elections and the full House 
confirmed Smith’s election, a result that Madison defended in remarks 
delivered a month later in May 1789.175  A fragment of that speech has 
been plucked out and featured as evidence in chief for the view that 
“natural born Citizen” in Article II means someone born in the United 
States.176  But an appreciation of the context of Madison’s remarks and 
Smith’s facts reveals the conclusion to be fundamentally mistaken. 
Madison began by asserting “that Mr. Smith, was on the declaration 
of independence, a citizen of the United States; and unless it appears 
that he has forfeited his right by some neglect or overt act, he had 
continued a citizen until the day of his election to a seat in this 
House.”177  He observed that the question of Smith’s citizenship was a 
matter of “the laws and constitution of South Carolina, so far as they 
can guide us; and where the laws do not expressly guide us, we must 
be guided by principles of a general nature.”178  What were these 
general principles? 
It is an established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance.  
Birth, however, derives its force sometimes from place, and sometimes 
from parentage; but, in general, place is the most certain criterion; 
it is what applies in the United States; it will therefore be unnecessary 
to investigate any other.  Mr. Smith founds his claim upon his 
birthright; his ancestors were among the first settlers of that colony.179 
Madison asserted that Ramsay “erred” in supposing that when America 
declared independence from Great Britain, a “tie of allegiance” 
continued between Americans and the King.180 
Madison’s reasoning to support his position is a fascinating 
discourse on his, and presumably other early Americans’, views on 
citizenship, political theory, and social contract theory.  He began by 
                                               
 174. Id. at 31. 
 175. See id. at 33. 
 176. See, e.g., McManamon, supra note 7, at 330 (noting that Madison is a reliable 
source of interpreting the Constitution since he helped draft the document and 
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distinguishing the “primary allegiance” persons owe to a “particular 
society of which we are members” and “the secondary allegiance we 
owe to the sovereign established by that society.”181  Thus, a South 
Carolina citizen, before independence, owed a secondary allegiance to 
the British King as a member of South Carolina society to which he 
owed a primary allegiance.  When South Carolina and the King 
separated in 1776, the secondary allegiance was broken, but the 
primary allegiance between the citizen and South Carolina remained.  
If that primary allegiance—“the original compact, which made them 
altogether one society”—had “dissolved,” then every former member 
“must individually revert into a state of nature.”182  Madison did not 
believe a reversion to the state of nature had occurred; rather, the 
enduring society of South Carolina upon independence 
“substitute[ed] a new form of Government in the place of the old 
one.”183  Using this reasoning, Madison explained why Smith’s 
continuing status as a citizen of South Carolina was relevant: 
Mr. Smith being, then, at the declaration of independence, a minor, 
but being a member of that particular society, he became, in my 
opinion, bound by the decision of the society, with respect to the 
question of independence and change of Government; and if afterwards 
he had taken part with the enemies of his country, he would have 
been guilty of treason against that Government to which he owed 
allegiance, and would have been liable to be prosecuted as a traitor.184 
Madison acknowledged that this would mean that all South Carolina 
“natives of America,” whether children or adults or within the state or 
abroad, automatically became members of the independent South 
Carolina.185  Those who then made a choice to “take part with Britain,” 
who were “of mature age,” and “had the power of making an option 
between the contending parties” (like Smith’s parents) would thus be 
guilty of “high treason” against South Carolina.186  But a minor, like 
Smith made no such choice; in other words, his “primary” allegiance 
to South Carolina continued and he made no affirmative choice to 
abandon it.  Accordingly, Madison concluded that: 
 So far as we can judge by the laws of Carolina, and the practice 
and decision of that State, the principles I have adduced are 
                                               
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 34. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 34–35. 
 186. Id. 
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supported; and I must own that I feel myself at liberty to decide that 
Mr. Smith was a citizen at the declaration of independence, a citizen 
at the time of his election, and, consequently, entitled to a seat in 
this Legislature.187 
Of course, Madison’s argument importantly presumed that Smith, 
by not returning to the United States or acting to advance the United 
States’ interests abroad, did not affirmatively choose the British cause 
between 1777 and 1783 when he was no longer a minor.  But Ramsay 
did not make this point and presented no evidence in the record to 
suggest otherwise. 
Thus, the full context of Madison’s May 1789 remarks reveals how 
little they had to do with birthright citizenship, whether by place of 
birth or parentage.  That should be obvious from the start because, 
unlike the Presidency, there is no constitutional requirement for the 
kind of citizenship a member of Congress must possess, only the 
condition of seven years of it.188  Accordingly, the crux of the matter 
was the citizenship status of individuals who had obtained citizenship 
through birth or parentage and were minors at the time of the 
American declaration of independence.  With respect to the nature of 
birthright citizenship, Madison’s observations, as noted, were cursory 
and secondary:  it comes “sometimes from place, and sometimes from 
parentage.”189  Place was logically the “most certain criterion,” since 
there is no need to reconstruct a person’s genealogy, and, according 
to Madison, “what applies in the United States.”190  This made it 
unnecessary to query Smith’s birthright, since he was born in South 
Carolina.  Madison added, however, in a remark that would be 
superfluous if jus sanguinis were entirely irrelevant, that “Mr. Smith 
founds his claim upon his birthright; his ancestors were among the first 
settlers of that colony.”191  This last point suggests that Madison might 
have concluded that, given his parentage, Smith was an American 
citizen even if he had been born outside the United States.  And recall 
that Madison qualified that place of birth was the criterion “in 
general,” implying that it was not dispositive in all places.  It is beyond 
doubt, however, that since Smith was born in South Carolina, 
                                               
 187. Id. at 35. 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall 
not have . . . been seven Years a Citizen of the United States . . . .”). 
 189. See Ramsay v. Smith, reprinted in CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, 
FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE, supra note 162, at 33 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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Madison’s remarks simply cannot be construed to rule out the 
possibility of American citizenship to children born to Americans 
extraterritorially at or after the time of Declaration of Independence, 
a factual context that was not present in the case. 
In summary, Madison’s May 1789 comments in the Smith controversy 
do not illuminate the Natural Born Citizen Clause in the way that some 
other commentators have presumed as precluding anything but jus soli 
as a natural birthright principle of citizenship in the United States, or 
as a full-throated adoption of British imperial precedent.192  To the 
contrary, Madison’s thinking illuminated the contractual nature of the 
American conception of natural citizenship—volitional, except for 
minors—and how it differed from British natural born subjectship.  If 
anything, then, Madison’s speech shows the fallacy of relying blindly 
on the English-British example for interpretive insight into the Natural 
Born Citizen Clause.  That is not to say that the prior history of “natural 
born subjects” in England was unimportant.  Rather, it must be 
examined and interpreted carefully, which I endeavor to do in Part II. 
II. ENGLISH COMMON LAW AND NATURAL BORN SUBJECTS 
The foregoing discussion in Part I featured American founding 
evidence directly relevant to the original meaning of “natural born 
Citizen” as a condition of presidential eligibility in Article II of the 
Constitution.  It is plain that the answer to this narrow interpretive 
question is linked to general conceptions of natural born subjectship 
in England and Great Britain, and natural born citizenship in Europe 
and the early United States.193  Commentators have focused most on 
the English example, given the importance of English common law as 
a jurisprudential source of the U.S. Constitution.194  Some of these 
Anglo-centric commentators have concluded that jus soli was the sole 
rule under English common law, implicitly denying the importance of 
                                               
 192. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 330 (arguing that Madison’s assertion that 
“place is the most certain criterion” of allegiance should be taken as a reliable 
interpretation of the Constitution (quoting Ramsay v. Smith, reprinted in CASES OF 
CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS, FROM THE YEAR 1789 TO 1834, INCLUSIVE, supra note 
162, at 33)). 
 193. See id. at 330 (explaining that no substantive distinction exists between “natural born 
subject” and “natural born Citizen” and that the shift from the use of “subject” to “citizen” is 
a result of the change from English common law to the new United States government). 
 194. See id. at 320 (noting that the U.S. Constitution derives important 
jurisprudential phrases from English common law such as “ex post facto,” “writ of 
habeas corpus,” “bill of attainder,” and “natural born Citizen”). 
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jus sanguinis with respect to the special case of children of English 
subjects born abroad.195  This denial of the role of jus sanguinis in 
English common law, in my view, is fundamentally mistaken. 
By the late eighteenth century, the common law of England 
recognized both jus soli and jus sanguinis as principles of natural 
birthright citizenship.196  It was true, as Chief Justice Alexander 
Cockburn of Queen’s Bench observed in 1869, that the ancient 
common law had recognized jus soli only: 
This rule, when originally established, was not unsuited to the 
isolated position of this island, and the absence of intercourse with 
foreign nations in Saxon times.  No children of English parents 
being born abroad, or children of foreign parents being born within 
the realm, the simple rule that to be born within the dominions of 
the Crown constituted an Englishman answered every purpose.  But 
when the foreign possessions of our kings and the increase of 
commerce had led to greater intercourse with the Continent, and 
children of English parents were sometimes born abroad, the 
inconvenience of the rule which made the place of birth the sole 
criterion of nationality soon became felt.197 
For the reasons Cockburn noted, starting in 1350, Parliament enacted 
statutes applying jus sanguinis to children born to English subjects abroad.198 
Proponents of the idea that jus soli alone was the rule at English 
common law point to such statutes as evidence that jus sanguinis was 
not “common law” but required Parliamentary action for activation.199  
As a jurisprudential matter, this viewpoint unduly simplifies the 
English understanding of lawmaking and the interaction between 
                                               
 195. See id. at 321 n.27, 327–28 (acknowledging that jus sanguinis had only a limited 
effect since it only applied to one generation of children); see also Pryor, supra note 25, 
at 886 (observing that although jus sanguinis existed, jus soli was the “guiding principle 
of nationality law in England”). 
 196. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 321 & n.25, 327 (finding that during the 
eighteenth century, jus soli standards were relaxed through the adoption of new 
statutes, and England began recognizing citizenship through jus sanguinis principles). 
 197. COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 7 (detailing that Cockburn was himself the son of 
an English envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the German Kingdom 
of Wurttemberg, and so had a personal interest in the issue of a foreign-born subject’s 
eligibility for high government office). 
 198. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.). 
 199. See McManamon, supra note 7, at 323 n.43, 324 n.44 (denouncing the belief that 
the passing of A Statute For Those Who Are Born In Parts Beyond Sea 1350 proves that jus 
sanguinis was common law by pointing out that the statute’s language itself says it will apply 
to children born “henceforth” and if the statute was actually common law, there would have 
been no need for subsequent legislation that clarified the statute’s meaning). 
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statutes and the “common law” tradition.200  Sometimes Parliament’s 
statutes were seen as breaking from that tradition; at other times, they 
were declaratory of it.201  Indeed, “some lawyers genuinely regarded 
the acts of the medieval high court of parliament as the decisions of a 
supreme court of law.”202 
How, then, can we distinguish between statutes that were constitutive 
of the common law and those that were not?  The answer lies in the 
vintage and continuity of rules declared in statutes and their 
subsequent validation by courts and treatise writers.  With specific 
respect to English and later British “natural born” subject status, jus 
sanguinis as applied to the children born abroad of the Crown’s 
officials such as ambassadors, courtiers, or soldiers had been 
memorialized in statutes since 1350 and had clearly congealed into 
custom by the late eighteenth century.203  The same inaugural 1350 
statute adopted jus sanguinis for the children of private subjects abroad 
such as merchants, which had also become part of the common law.204  
But, during the eighteenth century, Parliament passed new statutes 
deeming foreign-born persons to be natural born subjects on the basis 
of a paternal grandfather who was an Englishman,205 belief in the 
                                               
 200. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 169–70 (2d ed. 
1979) (arguing that a static view of common law is not supported by “historical fact” 
since “few legislative acts . . . could be regarded as radical departures from the 
common law tradition” and that although Parliament makes new law, they “do so 
within the framework of common law”). 
 201. See id. at 181–82 (explaining that judges had discretion to interpret common 
law into Parliament’s statutes or could firmly reject Parliament’s statutes if they were 
seen as “unreasonable”). 
 202. Id. at 170. 
 203. See, e.g., An Act to Naturalize the Children of such Officers and Souldiers & 
Others The Natural Borne Subjects of this Realme Who Have Been Borne Abroad 
During The Warr the Parents of such Children haveing Been in the Service of this 
Government 1698, 9 Will. 3 c. 20 (Eng.); An Act for the Naturalizing of Children of 
his Majestyes English Subjects Borne in Forreigne Countryes Dureing the Late 
Troubles 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 6 (Eng.) (extending jus sanguinis principles to foreign-born 
children of royalist retainers); A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 
1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.) (declaring that certain children who were born abroad 
would have the same inheritance rights as children born “within the same Ligeance”). 
 204. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 
1 (Eng.) (“And that all Children Inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born 
without the Ligeance of the King, whose Fathers and Mothers at the Time of their 
Birth be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the King of England, shall have and 
enjoy the same Benefits and Advantages . . . .”). 
 205. See The British Nationality Act 1772, 13 Geo. 3, c. 21 (Eng.). 
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Protestant religion,206 or service on British warships or merchantmen, 
or whaleboats.207  These newer more experimental statutes had not 
become part of the common law; indeed, one such nouveau statute was 
hastily repealed.208 
Where, then, did the notion that English common law was limited 
solely to jus soli four centuries after the first jus sanguinis statute was 
enacted in 1350 come from?  The conventional (and mistaken) 
perception is that it originated in the iconic 1608 decision in Calvin’s 
Case.209  The case involved the property, inheritance, and litigation 
rights in England of persons born in Scotland after King James VI of 
Scotland acceded to the English throne as James I in 1603.210  The issue 
was deemed important enough that all fourteen judges of the three 
common law courts—Court of Common Pleas, King’s Bench, and the 
Court of the Exchequer—were mustered to hear it.211  The most 
famous of the judges was Sir Edward Coke, who was Chief Justice of 
Common Pleas at the time.212 
The central holding in Calvin’s Case was that a subject owed 
allegiance to the King who is sovereign of the land into which the 
subject was born.213  Accordingly, a person born in Scotland after James 
acceded to the English throne was also a natural born subject under 
English law.  Such a person, a postnatus (“born after”) like Calvin,214 
could consequently own property in England, inherit property, and 
                                               
 206. See The Foreign Protestants Naturalization Act 1708, 7 Ann., c. 5 (Eng.), 
repealed by An Act To Repeal the Act of the Seventh Year of Her Majesties Reign 
Intituled An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1711, 10 Ann., c. 9 (Eng.). 
 207. See An Act for the Further Encouragement and Enlargement of the Whale 
Fishery, and for Continuing such Laws as are therein Mentioned Relating Thereto; 
and for the Naturalization of Such Foreign Protestants, as Shall Serve for the Time 
Therein Mentioned, on Board Such Ships as Shall be Fitted out for the Said Fishery 
1749, 22 Geo. 2, c. 45. (Eng.). 
 208. See 10 Ann., c. 9 (Eng.) (repealing 7 Ann., c. 5 (Eng.)). 
 209. See Calvin v. Smith (Calvin’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608). 
 210. Id. at 379. 
 211. See Price, supra note 19, at 82. 
 212. See id. at 74, 83 (calling Coke’s analysis of the case “the most influential” and 
“one of the most important English common-law decisions adopted by courts in the 
early history of the United States”). 
 213. See Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 409 (“[A]ll those that were born under one 
natural obedience while the realms were united under one sovereign, should remain 
natural born subjects, and no aliens; for that naturalization due and vested by 
birthright, cannot by any separation of the Crowns afterward be taken away:  nor he 
that was by judgment of law a natural subject at the time of his birth . . . .”). 
 214. Calvin’s real surname was Colville.  See Price, supra note 19, at 81. 
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sue or be sued in the English courts.  By the same token, the judges 
proclaimed that someone who was born in Scotland before James 
became king of England, an antenatus (“born before”), could not own 
property, inherit it, and sue or be sued in the English courts.215  In 
Coke’s own words, a rule of allegiance by place of birth was not only a 
“part of the law of England,” but it was also “jura natura” (natural laws), 
the “law of Nature,” and the “eternal law of the Creator.”216  Thus, the 
question whether jus sanguinis, the other great principle of birthright 
jura natura, operated with respect to children born to Englishmen 
outside of England did not come up at all in Calvin’s Case.217 
Nonetheless, what has led scholars to conclude that jus sanguinis is 
not a part of the common law, even as to the foreign-born children of 
English subjects, was the enactment of statutes to confirm the “natural 
born subject” status of children born outside the realm, beginning with 
the aforementioned statutes passed in 1350.218  If jus sanguinis was also 
part of the common law of England and would have been recognized 
by the common law courts, then why were the statutes necessary?  In 
part, as noted above, they were necessary because the common law 
judges did not rule on jus sanguinis in Calvin’s Case or any other case 
of the era.  Indeed, Calvin’s Case was litigated in the courts in the first 
place because Parliament had refused to enact a statute giving the 
postnati (and the antenati) rights to hold property in England and to 
sue and be sued in English courts.219  Ironically, if Parliament had 
enacted such a statute, Calvin’s Case would never have been decided, 
and jus soli and jus sanguinis would have stood on the same footing in 
England, both having been implemented by statutes.  Modern 
commentators would then have easily understood that both natural law 
principles were equally the common law of England. 
                                               
 215. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 391–92. 
 216. Id.; see Price, supra note 19, at 74 (emphasizing that the “law of nature” and 
thus “the eternal law of the Creator” required the Calvin’s Case judges to hold that 
place of birth determined one’s status). 
 217. Colville’s father, an early supporter of James VI, was a Scotsman, not an Englishman. 
 218. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 
1 (Eng.); see also McManamon, supra note 7, at 321 n.27, 327–28 (acknowledging that 
jus sanguinis had a limited effect since it only applied to one generation of children); 
Pryor, supra note 25, at 886 (finding that although jus sanguinis existed, jus soli was the 
“guiding principle of nationality law in England”). 
 219. See Price, supra note 19, at 85 (noting that the underlying legal question of 
Calvin’s Case concerned “an unsettled theory of sovereignty under which the question 
of who is a subject and who is an alien had to be reconciled”). 
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Instead, Parliament continued, in the absence of an iconic decision 
like Calvin’s Case to that effect, to enact jus sanguinis statutes to ensure 
that courts would recognize the subject status of English children born 
abroad in lawsuits that came before them.220  The statutes were, 
accordingly, not creative of a new category of birthright subject status.  
Rather, they were confirmative, but passed on the suspicion that the 
common law courts would be unduly favorable to jus soli and hostile to 
foreign-born descendants in cases before them.221  This fear was 
exacerbated after Henry VIII’s split from Rome and establishment of 
the Church of England, and resultant paranoia of foreign Catholic 
intrigues.222  For this reason, starting in the mid-sixteenth century, some 
Protestant English subjects sought and obtained private bills of 
naturalization for their foreign-born children because they were doubtful 
that the courts would honor natural law and the general statutes.223 
A. Natural Born Subject Statutes 
What were the defining characteristics of these English statutes 
extending subject status to persons who could not benefit from jus soli 
by virtue of having been born in England?  To start with, there were a 
great number of them:  I have found nearly a hundred statutes 
referencing “natural born subjects,” most of them passed in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Not all the “natural born 
subject” laws implemented jus sanguinis, as we shall see.  The basic 
structure of the statutes of greatest interest for present purposes was to 
“esteem,” “deem,” “adjudge,” “take,” or “hold” certain persons or 
                                               
 220. See id. at 77–78 (“[E]ven before Calvin’s Case, various acts and proclamations 
provided that a child born out of the territory of England could also be a natural-born 
subject . . . .  In the history of both Britain and the United States, the jus sanguinis has 
always been established by statute, never by judge-made law.”). 
 221. See John W. Salmond, Citizenship and Allegiance:  Nationality in English Law, 18 
LAW Q. REV. 49, 53 (1902) (discussing the shift in emphasis from jus sanguinis to jus soli 
in feudal English law). 
 222. See J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 392 (Yale Univ. Press 1997) (1969) (describing 
Henry VIII’s efforts to eradicate the papist influence in England). 
 223. See, e.g., The Titles of the Private Acts 1695–1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3 (Eng.) (listing 
“Private Acts” enacted in 1695 and 1696 “for the naturalization” of named persons);  
see also McManamon, supra note 7, at 348–58 (providing a partial list of naturalized 
Children who were born abroad to English parents between 1509 and 1800).  It 
appears that most of the commoner children naturalized were born to Englishmen 
with foreign wives.  There were several children born to English noblewomen, likely 
in service at the court when William and Mary held court in Holland.  See infra note 
244 and accompanying text. 
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groups of persons born outside of England to be “natural born 
subjects,” sometimes subject to conditions.  The chief aim of these 
statutes seems to have been to ensure that those declared natural born 
subjects were granted the same rights as those born within England 
with respect to the rights to inherit, hold property, and sue.  This was 
a particularly sensitive issue for Norman and other foreign-origin 
nobles (e.g., Dutch, German) in medieval and early modern England 
with deep ties to the continent, many of whom were also engaged in 
the King’s or Queen’s military campaigns there.  Indeed, a central 
focus of statutes from the fourteenth through the seventeenth 
centuries was to clear up the inheritance rights of knights and courtiers 
serving the king outside of England who might have children born 
while abroad.224  The inheritance rights of these children might be 
prejudiced vis-à-vis children of the same parents born in England, 
should the latter contest them in the king’s courts. 
The first and most famous of these statutes, De Natis Ultra Mare (“On 
Those Born Beyond the Sea”) was enacted by Parliament during the 
reign of King Edward III in 1350.225  This monumental and ancient 
statute, was cited repeatedly and with approval by the common law 
judges in Calvin’s Case.  Ultra Mare did not use the precise words 
“natural born subject,” but conveyed the same concept by confirming 
that certain foreign-born children had the same inheritance rights “as 
those . . . born within the same Ligeance” of England.226  The seed of 
the statute was planted in 1343 when questions were raised regarding 
the inheritance right of the king’s sons born outside of England.227  
The Chamber of Lords unanimously opined that they could but admitted 
doubt as to the right to inherit of the foreign-born children of English 
subjects.228  The Chamber of Commons agreed, but the matter was 
deferred for deliberation.229  The Black Plague occasioned more delay; 
De Natis Ultra Mare was ultimately enacted seven years later.230 
The statute began by explaining why it was enacted:  “[O]ur Lord 
the King, willing that all Doubts and Ambiguities” regarding “if the 
Children born in the Parts beyond the Sea, out of the Ligeance of 
                                               
 224. See J. GRAHAM JONES, THE HISTORY OF WALES 19–21 (2014) (explaining the 
order of rights to inheritance). 
 225. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 228. See id. at 8. 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. at 7–8. 
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England, should be able to demand any Inheritance within the same 
Ligeance.”231  It stated that “the Law of the Crown of England is, and 
always hath been such, that the Children of the Kings of England, in 
whatsoever Parts they shall be born, in England or elsewhere, be able 
and ought to bear the Inheritance after the Death of their 
Ancestors.”232  The statute then declared that two named sons and one 
named daughter of three English barons, 
and other which the King will name, which were born beyond the Sea, 
out of the Ligeance of England, shall be from henceforth able to have 
and enjoy their Inheritance after the death of their Ancestors, in all 
Parts within the Ligeance of England, as well as those that should be 
born within the same Ligeance.233 
The three named nobles, the Second Baron de Beaumont, the First 
Baron de Bryan, and the Second Baron D’Aubigny, were renowned 
knights.  It is unsurprising that the King and Parliament sought to 
protect the inheritance rights of children whom these loyal soldiers 
might have fathered while resting between battles fought on his behalf 
abroad.234 
The next part of the statute applied to commoners and declared that: 
[A]ll Children Inheritors, which from henceforth shall be born 
without the Ligeance of the King, whose Fathers and Mothers at the 
Time of their Birth be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the 
King of England, shall have and enjoy the same Benefits and 
Advantages, to have and bear the Inheritance within the same 
Ligeance, as the other Inheritors aforesaid in Time to come; so 
always, that the Mothers of such Children do pass the Sea by the 
Licence and Wills of their Husbands.235 
                                               
 231. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id.  The children granted citizenship by name were Henry, the son of the 
Second Baron John de Beaumont; Elisabeth, daughter of the First Baron Guy de 
Bryan; and Giles, son of the Second Baron Ralph D’Aubigny.  Id. 
 234. The statute made a special provision for illegitimate children, which tends to 
support the conclusion that the intended noble beneficiaries of the law were soldiers 
on campaign: 
And if it be alledged against any such born beyond the Sea, that he is a Bastard, 
in case where the Bishop ought to have Cognisance of Bastardy, it shall be 
commanded to the Bishop of the Place where the Demand is, to certify the 
King’s Court where the Plea thereof hangeth, as of old Times hath been used 
in the Case of Bastardy alledged against them which were born in England. 
Id. 
 235. Id.  The commoners’ part of the statute states that it applies to children “born 
without the Ligeance of the King” rather than children “born in the Parts beyond the 
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Unlike the statutory provision as to nobles, the commoners’ 
provision required both “Fathers and Mothers” to be subjects of the 
King.  Nor did it extend to a child born of a mother abroad who did not 
go there with her husband’s permission.  As such, the statute reflected a 
gender skew that English, American, and European jus sanguinis laws 
would exhibit until the mid-nineteenth century, well after the Natural 
Born Clause was adopted.236  More fundamentally, the reason for 
extending inheritance rights to the foreign-born children of commoners 
was, as Justice Cockburn noted, to facilitate foreign commerce, not to 
reward and protect loyal service to the King as with knights of the 
realm.237  The absence of reference to such rules as perpetual (i.e., “the 
Law of the Crown of England always”) supports the plausible inference 
that both rules as to the foreign-born children of Englishman nobles and 
commoners was of more recent provenance in 1350. 
The history of English “natural born subject” statutes enacted after 
De Natis Ultra Mare reflected the twists and turns of English history in 
subsequent centuries.  As noted above, anti-Catholic sentiment in the 
late sixteenth and early mid-seventeenth centuries triggered clouds of 
suspicion over English subjects who spent long periods of time abroad, 
particularly in Catholic kingdoms or jurisdictions.238  The English civil 
wars, however, resulted in large numbers of English royalists who went 
into exile abroad (including Charles II himself) for sustained periods 
of time, during which many had children.239  After Charles II returned 
to England in 1660 and the monarchy was restored, Parliament passed 
a statute in 1677 recognizing the inheritance rights of children born 
to royalist retainers abroad.240  The statute used the words “Naturall 
borne Subjects” with regard to the children of subjects who “did . . . by 
reason of their attendance upon his Majestie or for feare of the then 
                                               
Sea, out of the Ligeance of England” like the nobles’ part.  Id.  The difference in 
phraseology seems to be shorthand, not an intentional differentiation. 
 236. See generally RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 32 (2d ed. 1994) (“Another mode of acquiring nationality at birth by direct 
operation of law was by descent, according to the nationality of one, or both, of the 
parents, usually of the father alone . . . .”). 
 237. See COCKBURN, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 238. See Harvey Couch, The Evolution of Parliamentary Divorce in England, 52 TUL. L. 
REV. 513, 522 n.51 (1978) (noting that “[l]aws against Catholics and feelings against 
Catholicism” pervaded England in the 17th century). 
 239. P. H. Hardacre, The Royalists in Exile During the Puritan Revolution, 1642–1660, 
16 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 353, 353–54, 362 (1953). 
 240. See An Act for Naturalizing of Children of His Majestyes English Subjects Borne 
in Forreigne Countryes Dureing the Late Troubles 1677, 29 Car. 2 c. 6 (Eng.). 
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Usurped Powers reside in parts beyond the Seas out of his Majestyes 
Dominions.”241  It provided that any person who, between June 14, 
1641, and March 20, 1660, was 
borne out of his Majestyes Dominions and whose Fathers or Mothers 
were Naturall borne Subjects of the Realme are hereby declared and shall 
for ever be esteemed and taken to all Intents and Purposes to be and to 
have beene the Kings Naturall borne Subjects . . . shall be adjudged 
reputed and taken to be and to have beene in every respect and degree 
Naturall borne Subjects and free to all intents purposes and constructions 
as if they and every of them had beene borne in England.242 
The 1677 statute is the first one to use the phrase “natural born 
subjects” and merits sustained reflection.  First, it was limited in explicit 
terms and effect to royalist nobles who had stayed loyal to Charles II, 
even to the point of leaving their homes in England to go into exile 
with him.  The underlying rationale was to reward and protect loyal 
servants of the Crown, akin to the barons’ provision of De Natis Ultra 
Mare enacted three centuries earlier.243  Second, unlike the 
commoners’ prong of Ultra Mare, the statute applied to children born 
to “Fathers or Mothers” in “attendance upon his Majestie.”244  Presumably, 
there were ladies-in-waiting among the courtiers who had followed 
Charles II, and their children were explicitly covered.  Third, it is easy 
to comprehend the special circumstances that gave rise to the felt need 
for the retroactive enactment.  The statute was one part of a bundle of 
legislative efforts to restore the rights of returned Royalists who had in 
many cases been absent from the realm for as long as nineteen years.245  
As such, there would have been legitimate doubts about the loyalty of 
their children, even if the rule of jus sanguinis, as applied to the 
foreign-born children of public servants, had been absorbed into the 
common law during the 327 years since De Natis Ultra Mare. 
The next great event in English political history was the “Glorious 
Revolution” of 1688 to 1689, when the Dutch prince William of Orange 
and his English wife Mary assumed the British crown jointly as William 
                                               
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text (discussing De Natis Ultra Mare 
provisions). 
 244. 29 Car. 2 c. 6 (Eng.). 
 245. See id. (specifying children born outside of “his Majestyes Dominions” between 
June, 14, 1641 and March 24, 1660). 
372 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:327 
 
III and Mary II.246  Even after he became King of England, William 
spent considerable time outside England on military campaigns, 
mostly in France and Ireland.247  Mary herself returned to England in 
January 1689, a few months after William’s bloodless invasion, and 
ruled alone when her husband was abroad fighting.248  These were the 
circumstances behind the enactment of a “natural born subject” 
statute in 1697 entitled:  “An Act to Naturalize the Children of such 
Officers and Souldiers & Others the Natural Borne Subjects of This 
Realme Who Have Been Borne Abroad During the Warr the Parents 
of Such Children Haveing Been in the Service of This Government.”249  
The statute noted that 
dureing the late Warr with France divers of His Majesty’s good and 
lawfull Subjects . . . did by reason of their Attendance on His Majesty 
in Flanders and bearing Armes under His said Majesty against the 
French King and other His Majesties Enemies reside in Parts beyond 
the Seas out of his Majesties Dominions.250 
“[D]ivers Children” had been born to these “good and lawfull 
Subjects” during their government service abroad who, “by reason of 
their being borne” outside England “may be interpreted to be 
incapable of taking receiving or enjoying any Mannors and Lands or 
any other Privileges and Immunities belonging to the liege People and 
natural borne Subjects of his Kingdome.”251  Taking its lead from the 
1677 statute, Parliament provided that persons who, between February 
13, 1688 and March 25, 1698, 
are or shall be borne out of His Majesties Dominions and whose 
Fathers or Mothers were natural borne Subjects of this Realme and 
were then actually in the Service of His Majesty or of His Majesty and 
the late Queen of Blessed Memory are hereby declared and shall 
forever be esteemed and taken to all Intents & Purposes to be and 
to have been the Kings natural borne Subjects of this Kingdome and 
that the said Children . . . and every of them are and shall be 
                                               
 246. See STEVE PINCUS, 1688:  THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 285 (2009) (“[O]n 6 
February,[ 1689,] the House of Lords agreed that James II had abdicated . . . .  They 
then agreed to have William and Mary declared king and queen of England.”). 
 247. Id. at 298, 339 (describing “William’s departure to fight in Ireland” and his 
“war against France”). 
 248. Richard Price, An Incomparable Lady:  Queen Mary II’s Share in the Government of 
England, 1689–94, 75 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 307, 307–08 (2012) (detailing the Queen’s 
appointment to sole royal authority during William II’s absence in 1689). 
 249. 1697, 9 Will. 3 c. 20 (Eng.). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
2017] “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” 373 
 
adjudged reputed and taken to be in every respect and degree natural 
borne Subjects and free to all Intents Purposes & Constructions as if 
they & every of them had been borne in England.252 
Again, like the 1677 statute, the 1698 statute was limited to the 
children of loyal subjects who were abroad “in the Service of this 
Government.”253  It too applied to government servants who were 
either “Fathers or Mothers,” the latter presumably referring to ladies-
in-waiting who had served Queen Mary in the Netherlands in 1688 
before she had returned to England.254  Finally, commoners were 
unmentioned as in the 1677 statute, by contrast to De Natis Ultra Mare. 
Another statute enacted during the reign of William III as part of 
the 1700 Act of Settlement blocked any person “born out of the 
Kingdoms of England Scotland or Ireland” from government or 
military office, positions of trust, or crown grants.255  It provided that 
no Person born out of the Kingdoms of England Scotland or Ireland or 
the Dominions thereunto belonging (although he be naturalized or 
made a Denizen (except such as are born of English Parents) shall be 
capable to be of the Privy Councill or a Member of either House of 
Parliament or to enjoy any Office or Place of Trust either Civill or 
Military or to have any Grant of Lands Tenements or Hereditaments 
from the Crown to himself or to any other or others in Trust for him.256 
The statute explicitly carved out from the restriction on government 
service any person “such as are born of English Parents.”257  It was likely 
enacted to close off the prospect that the new royal House of Hanover 
                                               
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See LISA JARDINE, TEMPTATION IN THE ARCHIVES:  ESSAYS IN GOLDEN AGE DUTCH 
CULTURE 21 (2015) (summarizing a royal servant’s account of Princess Mary’s 
departure from the Netherlands on February 5, 1689). 
 255. The Act of Settlement 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3 (Eng.).  The Short Titles 
Act of 1896, 59 & 60 Vict. c. 14 (Eng.), did not assign the Act of Settlement a year, but, 
under the official Parliamentary convention of dating a statute according to the year 
the originating Parliamentary session commenced, the Act should be dated as 1700.  
However, it is also commonly referred to as the 1701 Act of Settlement, because that 
was the year Parliament enacted it.  Because William and Mary had no surviving heirs, 
the Act of Settlement provided for succession to the Irish and English thrones to the 
lawful descendants of Sophia of Hanover in modern-day Germany, a granddaughter 
of James I.  Id.  Sophia and the House of Hanover were Protestants, by contrast to the 
Catholic sympathies of the claimants to the thrones in the House of Stuart.  See A. W. 
Ward, The Electress Sophia and the Hanoverian Succession, 1 ENG. HIST. REV. 470, 477 
(1886) (detailing a Hanoverian historian’s description of Sophia as “a staunch 
protestant”). 
 256. 12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2, § 3. 
 257. Id. 
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would import German advisers to displace English ministers and 
officers.258  Michael Ramsey has suggested that this provision may have 
been “the original English precedent” for the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause.259  There is no evidence for the surmise, although it strikes me 
as plausible enough given that the Act of Settlement was a prominent 
enactment of which the early Americans were surely aware.  If Ramsey 
is right, then it is yet more evidence that the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause does incorporate jus sanguinis, given the explicit carve-out for 
foreign-born children with English parents. 
To summarize the state of English law at the start of the eighteenth 
century, several statutes declared that children born outside England 
to English subjects in government service were deemed “natural born 
subjects” or entitled to the same inheritance rights as persons born 
within the realm.  This applied regardless of whether the parent in 
service was a father (e.g., a knight in Edward III’s army or a courtier to 
Charles II in exile) or mother (e.g., a lady in waiting to Queen Mary).260  
Such persons were unencumbered in their right to occupy any position 
open to subjects in the government and to the Crown’s largesse.  
Second, De Natis Ultra Mare also granted inheritance rights to the 
foreign-born children of private English commoners like merchants to 
promote foreign commerce.261  Both parents had to be English 
subjects.262  The seventeenth century “natural born subject” statutes, 
cued to royal retainers exiled or campaigning abroad, did not replicate 
Ultra Mare’s extension to commoners; that would change in the 
eighteenth century.263  Regardless, De Natis Ultra Mare, a great and 
                                               
 258. See I. Naamani Tarkow, The Significance of the Act of Settlement in the Evolution of 
English Democracy, 58 POL. SCI. Q. 537, 542, 551 (1943) (discussing the theory that “the 
English Crown was offered to the House of Hanover on condition that whosoever 
accepted it should not at the same time hold any German dominions”). 
 259. See Ramsey, supra note 24, at (manuscript at 18). 
 260. See supra note 244, 254 and accompanying text. 
 261. A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.). 
 262. See id. (requiring that any children granted inheritance rights must be those 
“whose Fathers and Mothers at the Time of their Birth be and shall be at the Faith and 
Ligeance of the King of England”). 
 263. Compare An Act to Naturalize the Children of such Officers and Souldiers & 
Others the Natural Borne Subjects of This Realme Who Have Been Borne Abroad 
During the Warr the Parents of Such Children Haveing Been in the Service of This 
Government 1698, 9 Will. 3 c. 20, § 1 (Eng.) (conferring natural born subject status 
on children “whose Fathers or Mothers were natural borne Subjects of this Realme 
and were then actually in the Service of His Majesty or of His Majesty and the late 
Queen of blessed Memory”), with An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1708, 7 
Ann. c. 5 (Eng.) (extending the scope of naturalization to “the Children of all natural 
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famous statute enacted in 1350 during the fifty-year reign of one of 
England’s greatest kings, Edward III, cast its centuries-old shadow over 
the enactments of all subsequent Parliaments. 
The eighteenth century witnessed dynamic evolution in the jus 
sanguinis principle in England and Europe.  Change followed the rise 
of a global economy and the ideology of mercantilism.  The 
conventional wisdom of the time was that a country’s strength was 
measured by its population, its armies and navies, and its gold.264  
Accordingly, European monarchies raced to build empires and to swell 
the ranks of those they called subjects. 
The laws of the British Empire, in particular, underwent a seismic 
shift from a closed membership approach, anchored in insularity, to a 
more open-ended one, suited to a mercantilist empire (with the 
exception of Catholics).  For example, some British statutes took jus 
soli or jus sanguinis to new levels, as detailed below.  One 1740 jus soli 
statute granted “natural born subject” status to foreign Protestants, 
Quakers, or Jews who had lived in the American colonies for seven 
years.265  Parliament also stretched jus sanguinis beyond parentage to 
second-generation ancestry in a 1772 statute deeming any child born 
abroad with an English paternal grandfather a “natural born subject.”266  
Indeed, some innovative British statutes in this era of high 
mercantilism declared persons to be “deemed . . . and taken to be” 
natural born subjects on principles other than jus soli or jus sanguinis, 
such as co-religionists without any residence requirement,267 hardship 
service aboard warships,268 merchant ships in wartime,269 or on whaling 
                                               
born Subjects”), repealed by An Act to Repeal the Act of the Seventh Year Her Majesties 
Reign Intituled An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1711, 10 Ann. c. 9 (Eng.). 
 264. See D. C. Coleman, Mercantilism Revisited, 23 HIST. J. 773, 775 (1980) 
(articulating the commonly held belief that “gold and silver constituted wealth and a 
favourable balance of trade was the national means to acquire that wealth”). 
 265. See An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein 
Mentioned, As Are Settled or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in America 
1740, 13 Geo. 2 c. 7 (Eng.). 
 266. See The British Nationality Act, 1772, 13 Geo. 3 c. 21 (Eng.). 
 267. See 7 Ann. c. 5. 
 268. An Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America 1707, 6 Ann. c. 64, § 20 
(Eng.) (naturalizing foreign seamen serving as privateers, on warships, or on merchant 
ships during Queen Anne’s War). 
 269. An Act for the Better Supply of Mariners and Seamen to Serve in His Majesty’s 
Ships of War, and On Board Merchant Ships, and Other Trading Ships, and Privateers 
1739, 13 Geo. 2 c. 3 (Eng.). 
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boats.270  These statutes, applying what might be called the principles 
of jus religionis (“right of religion”) and cuius regio, eijus religio (“whose 
realm, his religion”); and jus muneris (“right of service”), were plainly 
departures from natural law, and accordingly never incorporated into 
English common law.271  As such, statutes awarding “natural born 
subject” status based on something other than the natural law 
birthrights of territory or parentage typically required oaths or 
declarations of loyalty and were constrained by statutory limitations on 
holding political or military office.272 
Despite these innovations, jus sanguinis in the eighteenth century 
never evolved to encompass natural birthright subjectship or 
citizenship through the mother where her allegiance differed from the 
father’s, whether in England, continental Europe, or the United 
States.  European and American society in 1787 to 1789 was extremely 
sexist by modern standards.  People believed that a child inherited a 
father’s allegiance and political ties, not the mother’s.  The idea that 
citizen or subject status could be derived by matrilineal descent did not 
gain a foothold until 1844 in Victorian England. 
The first of a series of eighteenth century “natural born subject” 
statutes was passed in 1708.273  The preamble nakedly asserted its 
mercantilist aim:  “Whereas the Increase of People is a Means of 
advancing the Wealth and Strength of a Nation.”274  Parliament 
declared that “the Children of all natural born Subjects born out of 
                                               
 270. An Act for the Further Encouragement and Enlargement of the Whale Fishery, 
and for Continuing Such Laws as Are Therein Mentioned Relating Thereto; and for 
the Naturalization of Such Foreign Protestants, as Shall Serve for the Time Therein 
Mentioned, on Board Such Ships as Shall be Fitted Out for the Said Fishery 1749, 22 
Geo. 2 c. 45, § 8 (Eng.). 
 271. Parliament repealed the Foreign Protestants Naturalization Act of 1708 in 
1711.  See KETTNER, supra note 12, at 72 (detailing the repeal of the general 
naturalization act by the Tories after they captured a majority in Parliament in the 
1710 elections). 
 272. See, e.g., An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others Therein 
Mentioned, As Are Settled or Shall Settle, in Any of His Majesty’s Colonies in America 
1740, 13 Geo. 2 c. 7 (Eng.) (requiring all persons born in “His Majesty’s Colonies in 
America” to “take and subscribe the Oaths” for naturalization); 13 Geo. 2 c. 3, § 3 
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to take any Office or Place of Trust, either civil or military”). 
 273. The Foreign Protestants Naturalization Act 1708, 7 Ann. c. 5 (Eng.), repealed by 
An Act to Repeal the Act of the Seventh Year of Her Majesties Reign Intituled An Act 
for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants 1711, 10 Ann. c. 9 (Eng.). 
 274. Id. 
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the Ligeance of her Majesty Her Heires and Successors shall be 
deemed adjudged and taken to be natural born Subjects of this 
Kingdom to all Intents Constructions and Purposes whatsoever.”275  A 
hyper-mercantilist part of the Act went even further, in the hope that 
foreign Protestants “would be induced to transport themselves and 
their Estates into this Kingdom.”276  They would be deemed “natural-
born Subjects” upon taking oaths of loyalty and the sacrament of the 
Holy Supper to join the Church of England.277  This provision was 
promptly repealed by 1711.278 
The 1708 statute differed in one significant detail from the 1350 De 
Natis Ultra Mare, the only predecessor statute extending jus sanguinis to 
the children of parents who were not abroad in government service or 
because of support for the Crown.  It was ambiguous whether both 
father and mother had to be English subjects, or just one parent; Ultra 
Mare had plainly required both parents to be English.279  Parliament 
passed a statute two decades later to “explain” away the ambiguity: 
[A]ll Children born out of the Ligenace of the crown of England, or 
of Great Britain, or which shall hereafter be born out of such 
Ligeance, whose Fathers were or shall be natural-born Subjects of 
the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, at the Time of the Birth of 
such Children respectively, shall and may . . . be adjudged and taken 
to be, and all such Children are hereby declared to be natural-born 
Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, Constructions 
and Purposes whatsoever.280 
Thus, the 1730 clarification confirmed that the 1708 statute had 
relaxed the two-parent jus sanguinis rule for commoners of De Natis 
Ultra Mare in 1350 to a requirement that only the father had to be a 
natural born subject for a child born abroad to be “adjudged,” a 
natural born subject “to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes 
                                               
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See 10 Ann. c. 9. 
 279. Compare 7 Ann. c. 5, § 3 (“And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, 
That the Children of all natural-born Subjects born out of the Ligeance of her Majesty, 
her Heirs and Successors, shall be . . .  natural-born Subjects of this kingdom.”), with 
A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea 1350, 25 Edw. 3 stat. 1 (Eng.) 
(“And that all Children Inheritors, . . . whose Father and Mothers at the Time of their 
Birth be and shall be at the Faith and Ligeance of the King of England, shall have and 
enjoy the same Benefits and Advantages . . . .”). 
 280. The British Nationality Act, 1730, 4 Geo. 2 c. 21, § 1 (Eng.). 
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whatsoever.”281  The 1730 statute further specified that neither it nor 
the 1708 Act “did, doth or shall extend, or ought to be construed, 
adjudged or taken to extend, to make” any such children natural-born 
subjects whose fathers were “attainted of High Treason” or “were or 
shall be in the actual Service of any foreign Prince or State then in 
Enmity with the Crown.”282  The 1708 statute, as clarified by the 1730 
statute, marked the extent of statutory definition of “natural burn 
subject” that was incorporated into English common law by the time 
of the American founding.  The relevant rules dated back to 1350, with 
the only significant modification being the relaxation of the parentage 
rule for subjects born abroad to English father only, as opposed to both 
parents.  In my view, it is this state of play—natural born status to 
children born abroad to government servants of fathers—that 
informed the jus sanguinis part of the “natural born Citizen” 
requirement in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 
The next four decades witnessed a series of statutes enacted by 
Parliament extending natural born subject status to groups based on 
new theories, in the spirit of the co-religionist statute enacted and 
quickly repealed during Queen Anne’s reign.  In 1739, Parliament 
passed “An Act for Naturalizing Such Foreign Protestants, and Others 
Therein Mentioned, as Are Settled, or Shall Settle, in Any of His 
Majesty’s Colonies in America.”283  The aim was so that “many 
Foreigners and Strangers from the Lenity of our Government, the 
Purity of our Religion, the Benefit of our Laws, the Advantages of our 
Trade, and the Security of our Property, might be induced to come 
and settle in some of his Majesty’s Colonies in America.”284  The statute 
provided that Protestants who had lived for seven years in the 
colonies—with no absence of more than two months at one time—who 
swore loyalty oaths to the Crown and took the Sacrament of the Holy 
Supper; Quakers who met the residence requirements and subscribed 
to a Declaration of Fidelity; and Jews who met the residency 
requirements and took the Oaths omitting some Christian expressions, 
                                               
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. § 2. An exception to the exception was made for, among others, “any Child” 
of a treasonous Father who “professed the Protestant religion” and had resided in 
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“shall be deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, his Majesty’s natural-
born Subjects of this Kingdom, to all Intents, Constructions, and 
Purposes, as if they, and every of them, had been or were born within 
this Kingdom.”285  The Act contained no limitation on where the 
relevant natural born subjects were born or who their parents were, 
thus going far beyond the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles.  However, 
the statute did contain the same exclusion from government offices set 
forth in the 1700 Act of Settlement vis-à-vis persons not born to English 
subjects.  Parliament enacted a statute in 1747 extending the terms of 
the 1739 statute.286 
Starting with a statute in 1707 during Queen Anne’s War, the 
eighteenth-century Parliament also enacted a slew of statutes 
extending natural born subject status to foreigners who served in the 
British military, navy, or in other hazardous or hardship duties.287  All 
of the statutes required oaths of loyalty and came with the formulae of 
restrictions on government service and crown largesse featured in the 
1700 Act of Settlement.288  The 1707 statute extended natural born subject 
status to foreign seamen who served for at least two years aboard British 
warships, privateers, or merchantmen during wartime.289  A 1749 law 
extended the proffer of jus muneris like the 1707 statute but with 
respect to seamen who had served for three years on whaleboats, not 
warships.290  A 1761 statute offered natural born subject status to “all 
such foreign Protestants, as well Officers as Soldiers, who have served, 
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 286. An Act to Extend the Provisions of an Act Made in the Thirteenth Year of His 
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or shall hereafter serve, in the Royal American Regiment, or as 
Engineers in America, for the Space of Two Years.”291 
Yet another variety of experimentation was a 1772 statute extending 
jus sanguinis to a second generation by making natural born subject-
ship available to the grandchildren of Englishmen who were 
Protestants.292  Parliament made clear its mercantilist aim: 
Whereas divers natural born Subjects of Great Britain who profess 
and exercise the Protestant Religion, through various lawful Causes, 
especially for the better carrying on of Commerce, have been, and 
are obliged to reside in several trading Cities and other Foreign 
Places, where they have contracted Marriages and brought up 
Families:  And whereas it is equally just and expedient that the 
Kingdom should not be deprived of such Subjects, nor lose the 
Benefit of the Wealth that they have acquired; and therefore that 
not only the Children of such natural born Subjects, but their 
Children also, should continue under the Allegiance of His Majesty, 
and be intituled to come into this Kingdom, and to bring hither and 
realize, or otherwise employ, their Capital . . . .293 
The statute then incorporated by reference the 1708 statute as 
“explained” by the 1730 statute deeming the foreign-born children of 
English fathers natural born subjects and proclaimed that “all Persons 
born, or who hereafter shall be born, out of the Ligeanace of the 
Crown of England” to those fathers “are hereby declared and enacted 
to be, natural born Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, 
Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if he and they had been 
and were born in this Kingdom.”294  Like the 1708 Act, this statute did 
not come with restrictions on government offices. 
The 1772 Act was the last major “natural born subject” statute 
Parliament enacted before the American revolutionary war.  
Accordingly, it is worth pausing to survey the four centuries of past 
statutes responsive to larger developments in England and the 
European world order.  Some commentators, like Michael Ramsey, 
have concluded based on this diverse thicket of “natural born subject” 
statutes that it had become a shape-shifting legal term of art meaning 
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 292. See The British Nationality Act, 1772, 13 Geo. 3 c. 21 (Eng.). 
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whomever Parliament designated.295  The implication for “natural 
born Citizen” is that Congress has similar discretion to define the term, 
including its use in Article II as a citizenship requirement for presidential 
eligibility.296  Accordingly, any person who is a citizen at birth under the 
statutes then on the books is eligible for the presidency.  Now-Judge Jill 
Pryor, Akhil Amar, and a thorough Congressional Research Service 
report by Jack Maskell, also take this position regarding the meaning 
of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, albeit without as self-conscious a 
commitment to originalism as Ramsey.297 
I disagree with those esteemed commentators and believe that the 
English statutes yield three basic principles that can inform our 
understanding of the meaning of “natural born Citizen” in Article II.  
The thicket of “natural born subject” statutes emphatically does not 
stand for the proposition that “natural born” had become a term of art 
that positive law can declare without basis in natural law.  First, there 
was an unbroken four-hundred-year-old rule dating back to De Natis 
Ultra Mare that the children of English fathers or mothers sent abroad 
in government service were natural born subjects without any disability 
as to rights to inherit, hold property, sue in English Courts, hold high 
office, or receive the Crown’s largesse.298  Indeed, it would have been 
perverse to penalize loyal government servants who went abroad on 
their sovereign’s orders by encumbering the rights of any children they 
might have during their service abroad. 
Second, there was also a rule grounded in De Natis Ultra Mare that 
children born to English merchant fathers abroad were natural born 
subjects, similarly without impediments.299  De Natis required mothers 
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child who had at least one U.S. citizen parent who met residency requirements to be a 
“natural born Citizen” and therefore eligible to be President). 
 298. See supra notes 224–45 and accompanying text (detailing the first English 
naturalization statute, De Natis Ultra Mare, which allowed certain foreign-born children 
the same rights as those born within England). 
 299. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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to be English subjects as well, but its mandate was loosened by a 1708 
statute as clarified by a 1730 statute.  Of course, the rights could be 
taken away from these jus sanguinis natural born subjects as they could 
be from jus soli subjects if the fathers committed treason, were 
banished, or served foreign enemies. 
Third, there were mercantilist statutes minted for the first time in 
the eighteenth century that deemed persons “natural born subjects” 
based on religion, military, or nautical service, and an Englishman as 
paternal grandfather.300  However, unlike natural born subjects in the 
first two categories, the newer statutes required those made subjects 
under their terms to take loyalty oaths and barred them from 
government office and Crown largesse. 
The first two rules ordained by De Natis Ultra Mare, one of the most 
famous laws of the realm enacted by one of its greatest kings, Edward 
III, had surely been absorbed into the common law of England by the 
late eighteenth century, 400 years after its enactment.  Their vintage, 
pedigree, fame, and constant reaffirmations through statutes 
cemented their status as jura natura, to use Coke’s expression for 
natural law birthright rules in Calvin’s Case.301  It is likely that common 
law courts of England in 1787 to 1789 would have enforced the two 
rules of jus sanguinis as to the foreign-born children of public servants 
or of Englishman merchant fathers, even without the existence of 
pertinent statutes, just like jus soli in the 1608 Calvin’s Case, which cited 
Ultra Mare with approval.  The newer eighteenth-century statutes were 
jurisprudential bushes by comparison to the towering live oak of Ultra 
Mare, and any natural born subjects they created would likely not have 
been recognized as such by the common law courts in the absence of 
the statutes.  Likewise, these rules of subjectship had not become part 
of the common law by 1787 to 1789, when the National Born Citizen 
Clause was adopted in the United States.  The modern American 
commentators who have concluded from the diversity of English 
statutes that “natural born subject” had become a legal term of art 
devoid of intrinsic meaning and wholly distinct from the common law 
have not examined the evidence and traced the evolution of English 
law with sufficient attention to the relevant history. 
                                               
 300. See supra notes 235–62 and accompanying text (discussing various statutes 
passed in order to facilitate foreign commerce, granting “natural born subject” status 
to various children born abroad to commoners). 
 301. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing Coke’s opinion that 
allegiance is not just a part of England but a law of nature). 
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B. Blackstone’s Commentaries and Early American Treatises 
A careful reading of William Blackstone’s Commentaries, the treaties 
of English law most valued by the American founders, confirms my 
threefold interpretation regarding whether the “natural born subject” 
rules in the statutes were part of the common law.  First, Blackstone 
acknowledged that “the children of the king’s ambassadors born 
abroad were always held to be natural subjects:  for as the father, 
though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the 
prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he was held 
(by a kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England’s 
allegiance, represented by his father, the ambassador.”302  The same 
might be said of any subject who is posted outside of England in 
government service.  Second, with respect to commoners, he wrote: 
To encourage also foreign commerce, it was enacted by statute [25 
Edw. 3 stat. 1] that all children born abroad, provided both their 
parents were at the time of the birth in allegiance to the king, and 
the mother had passed the seas by her husband’s consent, might 
inherit as if born in England; and accordingly it hath been so 
adjudged in behalf of merchants.  But by several more modern 
statutes these restrictions are still farther taken off:  so that all 
children, born out of the king’s ligeance, whose fathers . . . were 
natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects themselves, to all 
intents and purposes, without any exception; unless their said 
ancestors were attainted, or banished beyond sea, for high treason; 
or were . . . in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain.303 
Blackstone confirmed the shift from the two-parent rule of De Natis 
Ultra Mare for commoners to father only and that the foreign-born 
children of an English father were unconditionally natural born 
subjects.  He also explained the mercantilist aim of this extraterritorial 
extension of jus sanguinis.  Finally, he pointed out that a court had 
already “so adjudged in behalf of merchants,” indicating that the rule 
had become a part of the common law by judicial validation.304 
                                               
 302. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *373 (emphasis added).  Postliminum was a 
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supra note 15, at 7, 9–10; A. V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE 
TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 173–78 (London, Stevens and Sons & Sweet and Maxwell 
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What did Blackstone have to say about the non-jus sanguinis statutes that 
deemed certain persons natural born subjects on the basis of religion or 
service?  He discussed them in a brief, two-paragraph section detached 
from his discussions of Ultra Mare and the other statutes affording 
natural born subject-ship to children born abroad to ambassadors and 
English merchant fathers.305  He explained that naturalization could 
only be “performed” by an act of Parliament that put an alien 
in exactly the same state as if he had been born in the king’s 
ligeance; except only that he is incapable . . . of being a member of 
the privy council, or parliament, [etc.].  No bill for naturalization 
can be received in either house of parliament, without such 
disabling clause in it.306 
As we have seen, the requirement of a disabling clause did not apply 
to the foreign-born children of public servants and English merchant 
fathers.307  After this, Blackstone described the short-lived 1708 
“general naturalization act,” which was repealed in 1711, by which 
Parliament deemed all foreign Protestants who took the Sacrament 
and loyalty oaths natural born subjects.308  He then explained the other 
experimental non-jus sanguinis statutes: 
[E]very foreign seaman, who in time of war serves two years on board 
an English ship is ipso facto naturalized . . . and all foreign 
protestants, and Jews, upon their residing seven years in any of the 
American colonies, without being absent above two months at a 
time, . . . shall be . . . upon taking the oaths . . . naturalized to all 
intents and purposes, as if they had been born in this kingdom . . .  
and therefore are admissible to all such privileges . . . as protestants 
or Jews born in this kingdom are entitled to.309 
The takeaway is that Blackstone believed that the jus sanguinis statutes 
originating with De Natis Ultra Mare, deeming the foreign-born 
children of British public servants and merchant fathers natural born 
subjects based on English ancestry, were fundamentally different from 
the jus religionis and jus muneris statutes for foreigners.  The former were 
part of the common law tradition and natural law; the latter were not. 
Chancellor James Kent of New York interpreted English common 
law of natural born subjects in much the same way that Blackstone did 
in his lectures delivered at Columbia University starting in 1794.  Those 
                                               
 305. Id. at *374–75. 
 306. Id. at *374. 
 307. See supra Section II.A. 
 308. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *375. 
 309. Id. at *375. 
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lectures were subsequently published as his four-volume Commentaries 
on American Law between 1826 and 1830.310  Kent explained: 
An alien is a person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States.  
There are some exceptions, however, to this rule, by the ancient 
English law, as in the case of the children of public ministers abroad, 
(provided their wives be English women) for they owe not even a 
local allegiance to any foreign power.  So, also, it is said, that in every 
case, the children born abroad, of English parents, were capable, at 
common law, of inheriting as natives, if the father went and 
continued abroad in the character of an Englishman, and with the 
approbation of the sovereign.  The statute of [25 Edw. 3 stat. 1], 
appears to have been made to remove doubts as to the certainty of 
the common law on this subject, and it declared, that children 
thereafter born without the ligeance of the king, whose father and 
mother, at the time of their birth, were natives, should be entitled to 
the privileges of native subjects, except the children of mothers who 
should pass the sea without leave of their husbands.  The statute of 
7 Ann, c. 5. was to the same general effect; but the statute of [4 Geo. 
2 c. 21.], required only that the father should be a natural born 
subject at the birth of the child, and it applied to all children then 
born, or thereafter to be born.  Under these statutes it has been held, 
that to entitle a child born abroad to the rights of an English natural 
born subject, the father must be an English subject; and if the father 
be an alien, the child cannot inherit to the mother, though she was 
born under the king’s allegiance.311 
Thus, Kent, perhaps the most famous of the earliest commentators 
on the U.S. Constitution, clearly acknowledged the role of jus sanguinis 
with respect to extraterritorial natural born subjects under English 
common law.  He diverged from my interpretation in requiring an 
English mother in the case of public servants and failing to acknowledge 
the statutes of Charles II and William III that suggest the children of 
English mothers attending the Crown were also natural born subjects.312  
It is also noteworthy how much he emphasizes the sexist, patrilineal 
orientation of the rules, specifically emphasizing that “the father must 
be an English subject; and if the father be an alien, the child cannot 
inherit to the mother,” even if she were an English subject.313 
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Unfortunately, other early American treatise writers were not as 
astute as Chancellor Kent in their assessment of English common law 
and Blackstone’s treatise.  Several early American jurists misread 
Blackstone to say that English common law recognized only jus soli as 
a natural birthright principle, and that Parliament had to pass statutes 
for jus sanguinis to apply extraterritorially to the children of English 
government servants and merchants.314  We have seen that this was not 
an accurate reading of Blackstone, but it was an understandable one 
given the black-and-white manner in which Blackstone drew a line 
between aliens and natural born subjects elsewhere in the 
Commentaries:  “The first and most obvious division of the people is into 
aliens and natural-born subjects.  Natural-born subjects are such as are 
born within the dominions of the crown of England . . . and aliens, 
such as are born out if it.”315 
St. George Tucker316 who published the first U.S. constitutional law 
treatise in 1803 as an American law update of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, paraphrased him in the following way: 
Prior to the adoption of the constitution, the people inhabiting the 
different states might be divided into two classes:  natural born 
citizens, or those born within the state, and aliens, or such as were 
born out of it.  The first, by their birth-right, became entitled to all 
the privileges of citizens; the second, were entitled to none, but such 
as were held out and given by the laws of the respective states prior 
to their emigration.317 
Both Blackstone’s sweeping statement and Tucker’s adaptation of it 
to the American context did not contemplate the case of the children 
of citizens/subjects who were born in a foreign land while the parents 
were there temporarily, for instance, because the government had sent 
                                               
 314. See, e.g., 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES:  WITH NOTES OF 
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them there.  Kent, of course, did.  Indeed, Blackstone, too, explicitly 
acknowledged such cases:  “An Englishman who removes to France, or 
to China, owes the same allegiance to the king of England there as at 
home, and twenty years hence as well as now.”318  If that Englishman 
should happen to have a child while abroad, why should the infant be 
deemed a natural-born subject of the French king or the Chinese 
emperor, and not of the king of England? 
It is unsurprising that Tucker and other early Americans, with the 
exception of Kent, were prone to make general statements overlooking 
Blackstone’s explicit references to the status of children born to 
English officials and merchants abroad.  The sea that separated the 
British islands from the European continent was only eighteen nautical 
miles at their closest point; the United States was separated by a moat 
of thousands of miles.  The frequent conflation of “native born” and 
“natural born” citizen in early American treatises illustrates the extent 
to which early Americans were centrally concerned with what was 
happening within the United States, not extraterritorially.  As we saw 
from the Constitutional Convention debates, the words “native” or 
“native born” had a place-bound connotation, and were used to refer 
to persons born in the United States, typically to distinguish 
immigrants or foreign late arrivals.319  Plainly, “native” was a factual, 
descriptive adjective, without any jurisprudential implication of 
“natural” law generally or “natural” law birthright principles 
specifically.320  But Tucker’s Commentaries mistakes “natural born” for 
“native born” in in his discussion of the Article II, Section 1 citizenship 
requirement for President.  Tucker wrote: 
                                               
 318. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *369–70. 
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That provision in the constitution which requires that the president 
shall be a native-born citizen (unless he were a citizen of the United 
States when the constitution was adopted,) is a happy means of 
security against foreign influence, which, whereever it is capable of 
being exerted, is to be dreaded more than the plague.321 
To summarize, jus soli was the major principle of natural birthright 
citizenship within the United States, but it did not follow that jus 
sanguinis could not operate extraterritorially as to children born to 
certain Americans parents.  That was the rule in England promulgated 
by De Natis Ultra Mare in 1350 and part of the common law tradition 
four hundred years later as confirmed by Blackstone and the early 
American jurist James Kent.322  But, post-founding American treatises, 
starting with St. George Tucker’s American law update of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries published in 1803, tended to emphasize the first 
proposition only, making it seem as if jus soli was the only principle 
inside or outside the United States.323  The emphasis is understandable:  
the early writers’ focus was on persons inside the United States after the 
adoption of the Constitution between 1787 and 1789.  The birth outside 
of the United States of children to parents who were U.S. citizens was 
a negligible concern at the time:  the United States had only a few 
merchants and a handful of ambassadors abroad, and no soldiers on 
foreign expedition or governments in exile.324  Put another way, jus soli 
was discussed in absolute terms because the geographical separation 
of the United States from Europe and the geopolitical realities of the 
new republic’s military and economic weakness rendered operation of 
jus sanguinis vis-à-vis American citizens abroad a small concern as 
compared to the magnitude of the issue for the British Empire.  
Accordingly, with the exception of Kent’s Commentaries, early nineteenth 
century American treatises generally followed Tucker’s lead and did not 
address the question of whether a child born extraterritorially to U.S. 
parents is a natural born citizen.  As we shall see, the one time that 
early Americans were clearly focused on the question of extraterritorial 
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births to American citizens was when the First Congress enacted the 
inaugural Naturalization Act of 1790.325  And on that occasion, 
founding-era Americans adopted a jus sanguinis rule modeled on the 
great De Natis Ultra Mare.  But, before we turn to the American statutes, 
it is worth considering the influence of non-English sources on early 
American conceptions of natural born citizenship. 
III. NATURAL LAW AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 
Most Article II “natural born Citizen” scholars dismiss the possibility 
that the Clause relied importantly on non-English sources.326  Just as 
commentators tend to over-emphasize the exclusivity of English 
common law as a source of the meaning of “natural born Citizen,” they 
under-emphasize the importance of natural law and the law of nations.  
This is strange, given that the constitutional word “natural” is most 
plausibly an invocation of natural law birthright principles, and the 
reality that Lord Coke recognized in Calvin’s Case:  English lawyers of 
the time believed the common law was a reflection of natural law. 
The most important law of nations reference for founding-era 
Americans was the Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, 
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, a 1758 treatise 
by Emer de Vattel of Neufchatel.327  As I noted in the Introduction, the 
U.S. Senate bought Vattel’s book and Blackstone’s book, and those 
books alone, for its official use in 1794 to deal with foreign relations 
issues.328  Experts in U.S. foreign relations law have long been aware of 
Vattel’s importance to U.S. constitutional history.329  However, it has 
only been in the twenty-first century that scholars have mined his 
broader influence on U.S. law, including constitutional provisions 
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without direct connection to foreign affairs, such as the Eleventh 
Amendment, which addressed state sovereign immunity.330 
Unlike the English statutes and treatises, the Swiss republican Vattel 
wrote of citizens, not subjects.  He began: 
 The citizens are the members of the civil society:  bound to this 
society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally 
participate in its advantages.  The natives, or natural-born citizens 
[the French word is indigene], are those born in the country, of 
parents who are citizens . . . .  I say, that, in order to be of the country, 
it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, 
if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, 
and not his country.331 
In Vattel’s view, jus sanguinis trumped jus soli in determining “natural 
born” citizenship:  a child born in the territory of one sovereign was 
not a citizen of the sovereign if the child’s father was not a citizen.332  
The idea was that a child, as a minor, inherited the allegiance of the 
father through a “tacit consent” which the child could renounce upon 
coming of age.333  Note the resemblance of Vattel’s logic here to 
Madison’s reasoning in his May 1789 speech.  “[E]very man is born 
free; and the son of a citizen, when come to the years of discretion, 
may examine whether it be convenient for him to join the society for 
which he was destined by his birth.”334  Vattel’s conclusion that a child 
could consent to give up natural born citizenship as an adult diverged 
from Blackstone’s characterization of natural born subjectship in 
England as indefeasible.335  Tellingly, both Kent and Tucker agreed 
with Vattel and disagreed with Blackstone, in terms of what they viewed 
as the more universal principle.336  The reason for this flowed from the 
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difference between citizenship and subjectship.  Citizenship was 
grounded in consent which can logically be withdrawn; subjectship was 
bestowed and therefore created a permanent obligation of allegiance 
to the king. 
Vattel also had a different view of naturalization than Blackstone.  
He wrote: 
A nation . . . may grant to a foreigner the quality of citizen, by 
admitting him into the body of the political society.  This is called 
naturalization . . . .  [T]here are states, as, for instance, England, 
where the single circumstance of being born in the country, 
naturalizes the children of a foreigner.337 
Blackstone did not characterize the operation of jus soli in England as 
to an alien as “naturalization.”  Rather, he saw subjectship as a natural 
state of being for any person born in England, even of foreign parents, 
owing to the Crown’s protection that enveloped all at birth.  Vattel 
then proceeded to talk about the citizenship of children born to 
parents abroad. 
 It is asked whether the children born of citizens in a foreign 
country are citizens? . . . By the law of nature alone, children follow 
the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights; the 
place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot, of 
itself, furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has 
given him.338 
With specific regard to diplomats or soldiers abroad, Vattel reasoned 
that because they had 
not quitted their native country to settle elsewhere[,] 
. . . children born out of the country, in the armies of state, or in the 
house of its minister at a foreign court, are reputed born in the 
country; for, a citizen who is absent with his family, on the service of 
the state, but still dependent on it, and subject to its jurisdiction, 
cannot be considered as having quitted its territory.339 
In this regard, Vattel is in perfect agreement with Blackstone.  He 
believed that a child born outside of the father’s country, to an 
ambassador, soldier, “on the service of the state,” or even a private 
father is “by the law of nature” born a citizen of the father’s state.340 
To summarize, it was only intra-territorially that English common 
law and the law of continental European countries like France differed 
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as to who counted as natural born subjects or citizens.  The law within 
England was jus soli; the law within the continental nations was jus 
sanguinis.  But, all European nations agreed that, with regards to the 
children of subjects born extraterritorially, jus sanguinis applied.  In 
England, this was not the ancient common law of the Saxons, but it was 
surely common law by the late eighteenth century, 400 years after the 
first promulgation of the rule in De Natis Ultra Mare—“On Children 
Born Beyond the Sea.”341  The English hybrid model of jus soli and jus 
sanguinis was precisely what the United States adopted—jus soli within 
the United States and jus sanguinis outside of the United States for the 
children of citizen public servants and fathers.342  Both Vattel and 
Blackstone confirm the reality that late eighteenth century Europe and 
America were sexist by modern standards:  jus sanguinis operated 
through patrilineal descent only.343  The early United States did not 
adopt the rule of jus sanguinis over jus soli domestically, or at least that 
was the holding in the 1898 decision in Wong Kim Ark.  Where early 
Americans did opt for Vattel over Blackstone, however, was in the 
former’s conviction that allegiance was not permanent.344  And this was 
the natural consequence of the belief that citizenship, unlike 
subjectship, was based on consent. 
IV. “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES 
The five years between the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 and 
the adoption of the Constitution between 1787 and 1789 were marked 
with great change, turmoil, and experimentation.  Among other 
things, state legislatures enacted statutes using the words “natural born 
citizen” or “natural born subject.”  The purpose of these statutes was 
to declare that persons born outside of the relevant state were to have 
rights to inherit, hold property, and sue in the state’s courts; they did 
not address the specific issue of the rights or status of the children of 
state citizens born outside the state.345  Commentators like Ramsey 
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have emphasized these statutes’ seeming continuity with English 
common law, even to the point of using “natural born subject” long 
after the revolutionary war had been won.346  But, as I have pointed out 
earlier, these statutes did not envision or deal with the issue of the 
children of citizens who were born outside of the United States.347  
Moreover, any out-of-state citizens born in other U.S. states, as opposed 
to foreign states, would have been entitled to the same privileges and 
immunities as in-state citizens under both the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution.348  Nor, for that matter, is 
continuity with English common law inconsistent with my argument, 
since, as demonstrated above, the common law had incorporated jus 
sanguinis extraterritorially with respect to public servants and the 
children of Englishmen by the late eighteenth century.349  Accordingly, 
these statutes are largely irrelevant for present purposes. 
A. 1784 Maryland Statute Making Lafayette and His Male Heirs 
“Natural Born Citizens” 
There was another kind of state statute in the postwar, pre-
constitutional period that has not been examined by prior Natural 
Born Citizen Clause scholars.  Several state legislatures enacted laws 
granting citizenship status to foreign soldiers who had fought with 
distinction in the Revolutionary War, most notably the Marquis de 
Lafayette and Baron Friedrich von Steuben.350  Because these state 
statutes made the foreign soldiers citizens before “the time of the 
adoption of this Constitution,” they were constitutionally eligible to be 
President, since state law necessarily determined who was a “citizen of 
the United States” at the time.351 
                                               
 346. See Ramsey, supra note 24, (manuscript at 27–31) (discussing the tendency of 
states to follow the English use of “natural born subjects” in defining citizenship). 
 347. See supra Section II.B (explaining the lack of early American treatises dealing 
with the issue of citizenship for subjects born outside the United States). 
 348. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 349. See supra Section II.A (detailing the development of jus sanguinis throughout 
the eighteenth century English empire). 
 350. See, e.g., 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 439 (considering Marquis de Lafayette to be a 
“Citizen[] of this State”); 1785 Va. Acts 8 (declaring Lafayette to be a “citizen of this State”). 
 351. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see KETTNER, supra note 12, at 213–14 (noting that 
states “assumed sovereign control over naturalization,” and they granted citizenship to 
many British persons who served for America in the Revolutionary War). 
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A law titled “An Act for the Naturalization of the Marquis de la 
Fayette” passed by the Virginia General Assembly in 1785 is an 
illustrative example: 
 Whereas the Marquis de La Fayette is eminently distinguished, 
by early and signal exertions in defence of American liberty; And 
whereas this illustrious Nobleman continues to afford testimonies of 
unceasing affection to this State, and the General Assembly being 
solicitous to bestow the most decisive mark of regard which a 
Republic can give; 
Be it enacted, That the Marquis de la Fayette be henceforth 
deemed and considered a citizen of this State, and that he shall enjoy 
all the rights, privileges, and immunities, thereunto belonging.352 
The Connecticut legislature, in October 1784, went one step further 
and gave citizenship to La Fayette and his son: 
 Whereas the Right Honble the Marquis De La Fayette Mareschal 
De Camp of the Armies of the Armies of the King of France and 
Major General in the late Army of the United States of America in 
their late War with the King of Great Britain has exhibited his 
disinterested Attachment to the Liberties of Mankind in a very 
illustrious and disinterested manner— 
Therefore Resolved by this Assembly that the Marquis De La Fayette, 
and his Son George Washington Esqr be and they are hereby 
declared free Citizens of this State to all Intents constructions and 
purposes whatsoever.353 
Most interesting of all, the Maryland General Assembly, also in 1784, 
passed an act making Lafayette “and his male heirs for ever . . . natural 
born citizens,” the very words used in the Constitution.354  By operation 
of this statute, Lafayette was presumptively eligible to be President 
under both citizenship prongs of Article II—as a citizen of the United 
States at the time of the Constitution’s adoption and as a “natural born 
Citizen.”  Furthermore, because the Maryland statute appears never to 
have been rescinded, it would appear that any male heir of Lafayette, 
even today, could plausibly claim presidential eligibility as a “natural 
born Citizen” under the statute.  Despite its clear importance to the 
meaning of “natural born Citizen” in the U.S. Constitution, no prior 
scholarship on the Natural Born Citizen Clause has discussed it.  The 
                                               
 352. 1785 Va. Acts 8. 
 353. 1784 Conn. Pub. Acts 439. 
 354. See An Act to Naturalize the Major-General the Marquis de la Fayette and His 
Heirs Male For Ever, 1784 Md. Laws 378. 
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statute, entitled “An ACT to naturalize major-general the marquis de 
la Fayette and his male heirs forever,” provided: 
 Whereas the general assembly of Maryland, anxious to 
perpetuate a name dear to the state, and to recognize the marquis 
de la Fayette for one of its citizens, who, at the age of nineteen, left 
his native country, and risked his life in the late revolution; who, on 
his joining the American army, after being appointed by congress to 
the rank of major-general, disinterestedly refused the usual rewards 
of command, and fought only to deserve what he attained, the 
character of patriot and soldier; who, when appointed to conduct an 
incursion into Canada, called forth by his prudence and 
extraordinary discretion the approbation of congress; who, at the 
head of an army in Virginia, baffled the manœuvres of a 
distinguished general, and excited the admiration of the oldest 
commanders; who early attracted the notice and obtained the 
friendship of the illustrious general Washington; and who laboured 
and succeeded in raising the honour and the name of the United 
States of America:  Therefore, 
Be it enacted, by the general assembly of Maryland, That the marquis 
de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever, shall be, and they and each 
of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born 
citizens of this state, and shall henceforth be entitled to all the 
immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof, 
they and every of them conforming to the constitution and laws of 
this state, in the enjoyment and exercise of such immunities, rights 
and privileges.355 
The Maryland legislature’s 1784 grant of “natural born citizenship” 
to Lafayette and his male heirs forever because of his heroic military 
service and labor in “raising the honour and the name of the United 
States of America” generates three key insights.356  First, it suggests that 
Americans of the time accepted that a legislature might grant natural 
born citizenship to someone not born in the United States or born 
abroad to U.S. parents for proven loyalty to the political community of 
the United States.  It was in this sense similar to the British jus muneris 
for soldiers and seamen.357  But, unlike those British natural born 
subject statutes, natural born citizenship under the 1784 American 
                                               
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. See An Act for the Encouragement of Trade to America 1707, 6 Ann. c. 64, § 20 
(Eng.) (granting citizenship to soldiers and seamen who served for at least two years 
during Queen Anne’s War). 
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statute was without limitation on office-holding or contingent on oaths 
of loyalty or on any other condition. 
Second, the statute reinforces the patrilineal understanding of “natural 
born Citizen” in the 1780s and the prominence of jus sanguinis as a natural 
birthright principle.  Not only was Lafayette himself made a natural born 
citizen because of his loyal service, but the statute also presumes that 
his descendants, who have his blood, will also be loyal.358  But only his 
male descendants are declared to be natural born citizens “for ever.”359 
Third and most importantly, the statute suggests that a U.S. 
legislature might deem a person a “natural born Citizen” based on a 
connection to the United States other than birthplace.  At first glance, 
this appears to validate the congressional naturalization power theory 
of Ramsey, Maskell, Pryor, and Amar, regarding the meaning of 
“natural born Citizen.”360 On their view, if Congress were to pass the 
same statute today with respect to Lafayette’s descendants declaring 
them “natural born Citizens,” then any descendant of Lafayette born 
after the statute was enacted could be President of the United States.361  
Ramsey, for instance, concludes that Congress’s power to enact a 
statute conveying natural born status could not be applied to persons 
“with no connections to the United States at birth.”362  But, Lafayette’s 
heirs surely have a very strong connection to the United States by virtue 
of being the lineal descents of a founding father, akin to present-day 
lineal descendants of Alexander Hamilton or Benjamin Franklin.  And 
the 1784 Maryland statute’s extension of natural born citizen status to 
Lafayette’s “heirs male for ever” supplies direct founding-era evidence 
that they have the requisite connections to the United States at birth 
that Ramsey would require. 
In my opinion, the reason why the 1784 Maryland statute ultimately 
does not support a general naturalization power under Article I to 
confer natural born citizenship sufficient for presidential eligibility on 
any deserving foreigner or similarly situated group of foreigners is 
found in the other citizenship option for presidential eligibility.  Recall 
                                               
 358. See 1784 Md. Laws 378. 
 359. Id. 
 360. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 361. Congress does still grant honorary citizenship (e.g., to Winston Churchill), but 
it does not come with the rights of natural born citizenship or even regular U.S. 
citizenship.  See H.R. Rep. No. 113-548, at 2 (2014) (granting honorary citizenship to 
Bernardo de Gálvez y Madrid and noting that Churchill had previously been granted 
honorary citizenship). 
 362. Ramsey, supra note 24, (manuscript at 42). 
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that Article II provides that any person who was a citizen of the several 
United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution is also 
eligible to be President.363  Thus, Lafayette would have been eligible to 
be President by operation of the pre-constitutional Virginia and 
Connecticut statutes conferring citizenship on him, without the need 
for the “natural born citizens” provision of the Maryland statute.  As 
discussed in Section I.B above, the purpose of Article II’s provision of 
presidential eligibility for citizens at the time of the Constitution’s 
adoption was to recognize the special contribution of foreign soldiers 
like Lafayette who had fought to establish the new Republic.  This was 
the same purpose animating the 1784 Maryland statute.  This sort of 
special recognition, however, was a unique, one-time exception, not a 
justification that might be replicated by Congress or any state 
legislatures in the future.  This may explain why neither the United 
States nor the states enacted any more statutes like the 1784 Maryland 
statute granting non-honorific, natural born citizenship to foreigners 
after the Constitution was adopted.  Let us turn now to the first 
naturalization statute enacted by the new Congress six years later in 
1790, which also used the words “natural born citizens.” 
B. 1790 Naturalization Statute and Subsequent U.S. Naturalization Statutes 
The First Congress’s inaugural uniform naturalization statute 
became law on March 26, 1790.364  The 1790 statute is the only U.S. 
national law other than Article II to use the words “natural born 
citizens.”365  The use of those extinct words, coupled with the fact that 
the 1790 statute was enacted only two years after the Constitution’s 
adoption by a Congress that included several members who had played 
leading roles the Constitution’s drafting and ratification, explains its 
rightful prominence in all existing accounts of the meaning of the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause. 
The particular context in which the words “natural born citizens” 
are used in the 1790 statute, however, had nothing to do with 
presidential eligibility.  The phrase was used in a secondary part of the 
statute to designate certain persons born outside of the United States 
who did not have to apply and meet the residence, oath, and good 
character requirements for any other person born outside the United 
                                               
 363. See U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 5. 
 364. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (1795). 
 365. Id. at 104. 
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States to become a U.S. citizen.366  The statute’s primary purpose was 
to specify these “naturalization” requirements. 
Thus, the statute’s first and main provision stated that “any alien 
being a free white person” who had resided two years within the United 
States “may be admitted to become a citizen” by applying to “any 
common law court of record” in a state “wherein he shall have resided” 
for a year, “making proof” of good character, and taking an oath or 
affirmation to support the U.S. Constitution.367  The statute continued, 
“the children of such persons so naturalized, dwelling within the 
United States” and “under the age of twenty-one years at the time of 
such naturalization, shall also be considered as citizens of the United 
States.”368  The last sentence of the statute, in which the words “natural 
born citizens” appeared, provided in full: 
And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born 
beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be 
considered as natural born citizens:  Provided, That the right of 
citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never 
been resident in the United States:  Provided also, That no person 
heretofore proscribed by any state, shall be admitted a citizen 
aforesaid, except by an act of the legislature of the state in which 
such person was proscribed.369 
A few observations are in order about the statute.  First, it bears a 
remarkable resemblance to the 1350 statute De Natis Ultra Mare which 
literally means “on children born beyond sea.”  As noted above, this 
landmark statute did not use the exact words “natural born subjects,” 
but it was the undisputed ancestor of Parliament’s later “natural born 
subject” statutes, such as the Act of 1708, as Blackstone acknowledged 
in the Commentaries.370  However, Blackstone did not quote the precise 
words “children born beyond sea,” instead writing “all children born 
abroad.”371  This suggests that the First Congress knew the original 
source or knew about it from a source other than Blackstone.  The 
bottom line is that the four centuries-old De Natis Ultra Mare was a 
monumental statute, likely known not just to the lawyers among the 
founding Americans like John Adams or Alexander Hamilton, but to 
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 367. Id. at 103. 
 368. Id. at 104. 
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 370. See supra notes 341–44 and accompanying text. 
 371. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *373. 
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many in the United States who had themselves been “children born 
beyond sea” in their former lives as British subjects. 
Second, like the 1708 English statute, the American statute appears 
ambiguous about whether both parents had to be U.S. citizens or only 
one parent, possibly a mother, had to be a U.S. citizen.  Recall, 
however, that Parliament enacted a statute in 1730 to “explain” that 
the ambiguous 1708 statute referred to the children of English fathers 
only.372  And De Natis Ultra Mare had required both parents to be 
English.  Two esteemed modern commentators, Paul Clement and 
Neal Katyal, however, resolve the ambiguity in the 1790 U.S. statute to 
mean that only one parent, either mother or father, had to be a U.S. 
citizen:  “The Naturalization Act of 1790 expanded the class of citizens 
at birth to include children born abroad of citizen mothers as long as the 
father had at least been resident in the United States at some point.”373  A 
crucial step in their analysis is the statute’s command that the father 
must have been “resident in the United States.”374  They conclude from 
this condition that the statute applied to a foreign-born child of a U.S. 
citizen mother and non-citizen father so long as the foreign father was 
“resident in the United States” before the child’s birth.375 
This is an utterly implausible reading of the 1790 statute.  The only 
way to read the father’s residence requirement in light of the practical 
realities of the late eighteenth century is to read it as implicitly 
presuming that the father of the child was a U.S. citizen with prior 
residence in the United States.  The notion that the First Congress 
contemplated an American woman meeting a foreign man in the 
United States and followed him back to his country to have a child 
                                               
 372. See The British Nationality Act 1730, 4 Geo. 2 c. 21, § 1 (Eng.).  The 1790 U.S. 
statute also carved out of “natural born” citizen status the children of fathers who had 
not been proscribed by any States, which is similar to the 1730 statute’s exception from 
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there, however ordinary it may seem today, is anachronistic.  Even now, 
no national immigration statute, in the United States or otherwise, 
provides that a person may be a citizen if a mother is a citizen and the 
foreign father lived at some point in the mother’s country.  All modern 
statutes require only the parent (whether mother or father) from 
whom the child’s citizenship is derived to have resided in the country; 
the foreign parent’s residence in the country is irrelevant. 
Why then, one might wonder, did the First Congress require that a 
U.S. citizen father have resided in the United States for him to pass 
U.S. citizenship on to his child born abroad?  The answer is simple 
enough.  If there were no residency requirement, then it would be 
possible for a future child, generations later, to have “natural born” 
U.S. citizenship, despite being long removed from any ancestors who 
lived there and possessed residual loyalty to the United States.  A child 
born outside of the United States, who derived her U.S. citizenship 
from her father who was born and lived his entire life abroad and who 
derived his U.S. citizenship from his father (her grandfather) who was 
the last ancestor to have lived in the United States would still be a 
“natural born citizen.”  The chain could regress infinitely.376  The 
parental residency requirement is intended to prevent this potentially 
infinite regress. 
Indeed, the specific residency duration requirement for a U.S. 
citizen father who originates derivative citizenship for his foreign-born 
child is the one aspect of who counts as a “natural born Citizen” 
                                               
 376. James Wilson, who, as we have seen, played a leading role in the congressional 
citizenship requirement debates at the Constitutional Convention, may have suggested 
in a pamphlet that he wrote in 1768 that this infinite regress was consistent with natural 
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were born within the British Empire.  To the extent he refers explicitly to jus sanguinis, 
however, it seems he is suggesting that children born outside of England (but in the 
colonies) whose parents are both loyal British subjects, or the children of loyal subject 
couples, would be natural born subjects, too, potentially ad infinitum.  I am grateful to 
John Mikhail for pointing me to this discussion. 
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eligible to be President under Article II that the Constitution leaves to 
Congress’s discretion.  The natural law principle of jus sanguinis in the 
late eighteenth century only dictated that a child born 
extraterritorially inherits the father’s nationality.377  It did not 
necessarily compel prior residence in the country in question, much 
less a specific term of years to establish the citizen father’s prior 
residence—that was the office of positive law via enactment.378  In a 
recent case, Sessions v. Morales-Santana,379 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Congress may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, 
enact different period-of-residence requirements for unwed fathers 
and mothers to pass U.S. citizenship to their children.380  The Court in 
Morales-Santana did not purport to address the constitutional meaning 
of “natural born Citizen” as a condition for presidential eligibility in 
Article II.381  However, the Court’s decision would presumably apply to 
hold Congress to enacting the same residency requirement for U.S. 
citizenship of fathers and mothers of children born abroad who are 
entitled to U.S. citizenship by birth. 
One last point worth mentioning about the 1790 U.S. statute, as 
compared to the prior English statutes, is that it underscores the 
difference between natural born “subjectship” and “citizenship.”  
Recall that the experimental eighteenth-century, British “natural born 
subject” statutes for foreigners who were Protestants or served in the 
military, merchant ships, or whaleboats, came with conditions on 
holding government offices.382  The limitation illustrated the 
subordinate nature of “subjectship” to the Crown bestowed by 
Parliament, which could impose prohibitions on what those whom it 
deemed natural born subjects could do.  Natural born “citizenship” in 
the United States, by contrast, could not be granted subject to 
conditions on office-holding that Congress deemed proper. 
Subsequent Congresses replaced the phrase “natural born Citizens” 
in the 1790 statute with “citizens of the United States” in the next four 
naturalization statutes of 1795,383 1798 (one of the infamous Alien and 
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Sedition Acts),384 1802,385 and 1855.386  The 1795 statute is particularly 
important because it was the enactment that repealed the 1790 statute 
and substituted “citizens of United States” for “natural born citizens.”387 
The 1795 statute was more demanding as to the requirements for 
naturalization, consistent with greater concern for foreign monarchical 
influence during a time of revolutionary turmoil in Europe.388  For 
example, although the new statute provided that any foreigner who 
was a “free white person” then residing in the United States was 
grandfathered into the two-year residence requirement of the 1790 
statute, in the future, any aliens would have to reside for five years.389  
They would also have to make an oath or affirmation of “bona fide” 
intent to become citizens of the United States at least three years before 
becoming citizens.390  And, in addition to taking the oath or affirmation 
to support the Constitution prescribed by the 1790 law, any foreigner 
seeking to be admitted had to “absolutely and entirely renounce and 
abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, 
state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly by name, the prince, 
potentate, state, or sovereignty, whereof he was before a citizen or subject.”391 
Another important change from the 1790 Act was the structure of 
the statute.  Instead of the final sentence of the 1790 statute, in which 
“natural born citizens” was used to signify who did not require 
naturalization, the 1795 statute combined the two “children of” 
                                               
 384. An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); An Act in 
Addition to the Act, Entitled “An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against 
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provisions of the prior statute.392  Thus, section 3 of the 1795 statute 
provided that the following shall be “considered as citizens of the 
United States”:  (1) children of “persons duly naturalized” living within 
the United States who were less than twenty-one years of age at the time 
of the parent’s naturalization and (2) “the children of citizens of the 
United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United 
States.”393  The provision continued the requirements that fathers had 
to have been resident in the United States and that no person proscribed 
by a state could be admitted absent the consent of the relevant state 
legislature.394  But, a new condition was added barring any person “who 
has been legally convicted of having joined the army of Great Britain 
during the late war.”395  This last provision echoed the 1730 English 
statute’s exclusion of the children of fathers who had served in the 
armies of foreign enemies from natural born subject status.396 
The 1795 statute’s formulation grouped together as U.S. citizens the 
children of naturalized citizens living within the United States who were 
less than twenty-one years old with the children of U.S. citizens born 
abroad, whom the 1790 statute had declared to be “natural born citizens.”  
But, the children in the former group were not necessarily “natural 
born citizens” by operation of jus soli because they might have been 
born abroad like their naturalized parents.  The 1790 statute, by 
contrast, had distinguished the children of naturalized citizens who 
became U.S. citizens through derivative citizenship as minors.  Thus, 
when St. George Tucker observed that “Persons naturalized according 
to these acts [of 1790 and 1795], are entitled to all the rights of natural-
born citizens, except . . . they are forever incapable of being chosen to the 
office of president of the United States,”397 he was referring to these children 
of naturalized citizens, not the children of U.S. citizens born “beyond sea” 
who had been deemed “natural born citizens” by the 1790 Act. 
It bears remembering that the 1790 U.S. statute and its successors 
were naturalization statutes defining who does—and does not—have to 
follow legislated naturalization procedures (oaths, residence 
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requirements) to be a U.S. citizen.398  Under the statutes, children born 
abroad to U.S. citizen fathers who previously resided in the United 
States, “natural born citizens,” did not have to follow these procedures.  
The 1790 statute explicitly used the words “natural born citizens” to 
designate this category of extraterritorially born citizens.399  The 1795 
statute that repealed it referred to them as simply “citizens of the 
United States,” lumping them together with children within the 
United States who obtained derivative citizenship when their parents 
naturalized.400  But, there was no shift in purposes from 1790 to 1795, 
that is, to revise the set of persons eligible to be President.  In fact, none 
of the statutes were designed to address eligibility to be President or 
even a member of Congress.  From the fourteenth to eighteenth 
centuries, the key legal benefit of being deemed “natural born” under 
the English statutes and the 1790 U.S. statute was the right to hold 
property, and, as corollary, to inherit—rights denied to aliens at the 
time.401  Furthermore, the ambiguity in the 1790 statute about whether 
a foreign-born child had to have both parents be U.S. citizens, just the 
father be a U.S. citizen, or either parent be a U.S. citizen, is resolved 
in favor of just the father when one considers the context of the 
residency requirement for the father and the English statutory 
precedents, namely the 1730 statute. 
One important feature of this account is the sexism implicit in the 
original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, something that 
other scholarship has not emphasized.  We forget today how sexist 
American and European society was in the late eighteenth century.  As 
the doctrine of coverture demonstrates, the conventional wisdom of 
the time was that women were not made to have active political lives 
independent of their husbands.402  When viewed in the broader 
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context of these contemporaneous social norms, it becomes evident 
that jus sanguinis did not operate by matrilineal descent when parents 
differed in citizenship or subjectship (a much rarer combination than 
now).  A child took the nationality of the father, not the mother.  The 
idea was so deeply embedded that it did not need to be spoken or 
written about—it was an omnipresent presumption. 
It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the notion that 
nationality could pass through the mother began to take root, in large 
part because of historical political developments, similar to the 
evolution of earlier English “natural born subject” statutes.  Great 
Britain, under Queen Victoria in 1844, was the first European nation 
to enact a statute extending natural born subject status to the lawful 
children of Englishwomen born outside of her majesty’s dominions.403  
The statute was enacted under a Queen at a time when the British 
Empire was greatly expanding.  In medieval times, the primary reason 
for extending jus sanguinis to the foreign-born children of public 
servants or English merchants was domestic:  to protect these 
children’s inheritance and property rights in England.404  In the 
eighteenth century, mercantilism supplied a new justification for 
growing the numbers of British subjects.  But, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, there was another important international reason for 
expanding the numbers of British nationals.  The primary justification 
for the use of armed force in international affairs during the mid-
nineteenth to early twentieth centuries was the protection of the 
property and persons of a country’s nationals abroad.405  By increasing 
the numbers of those who might claim British nationality, the British 
Empire increased its ability to claim lawful grounds to use force. 
The U.S. Congress rejected the model of British Parliament’s 1844 
extension of jus sanguinis to matrilineal descent for extraterritorial 
births under Queen Victoria.  American progressives subsequently 
proposed a similar bill, but Congress not only failed to enact it, it 
passed a statute in 1855 prohibiting U.S. citizenship to children born 
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outside the United States to U.S. citizen mothers.406  In fact, it was not 
until 1934 that Congress enacted a law declaring children born abroad 
to U.S. citizen mothers who had resided in the United States to be 
citizens if they entered the United States before age eighteen and lived 
there for five years.407  This was several decades after the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, 
and fourteen years after the Nineteenth Amendment granted women 
suffrage in 1920.408  This chronology indicates that the Equal 
Protection Clause was not viewed as implicated by the differing 
citizenship treatment of foreign-born children of U.S. fathers as 
opposed to mothers until the mid-twentieth century,409 long after 
American jurists had abandoned natural law as a direct source of 
jurisprudence regarding citizenship. 
The Fourteenth Amendment also provides:  “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”410  This provision does not address the requirement of being a 
“natural born Citizen” to be eligible to be President, or, for that matter, 
eligibility for any high national office.  Instead, it articulates a non-
discrimination principle among persons who are “born or naturalized 
in the United States” and subject to its jurisdiction with respect to their 
U.S. and state citizenship.411  By its express terms, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not address persons “born or 
naturalized” outside the United States.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in 
Wong Kim Ark v. United States,412 interpreted this provision to mean that 
a person born in U.S. territory to Chinese parents was a U.S. citizen, 
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regardless of the parent’s presumptive allegiance to the Chinese 
emperor.413  The Court, in its opinion, embraced the principle of jus 
soli as a constitutional birthright principle and rejected the idea that 
jus sanguinis trumped it as to the child of private Chinese subjects born 
on American soil.414  However, it had no occasion to decide upon the 
application of jus sanguinis to the U.S. citizenship of children born of 
American parents abroad. 
* * * 
To sum up Parts II through IV, the two natural law birthright 
principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis co-existed in the early modern 
European legal order, although jus soli had deeper roots in England, 
an island nation, and jus sanguinis was dominant on the European 
continent.  But, both jurisdictions recognized that jus sanguinis 
operated vis-à-vis children born to public servants or private fathers 
abroad.  Jurisprudentially speaking, the rule that jus sanguinis applied 
extraterritorially was English common law and the law of nations—
both in turn were instantiations of natural law.  This understanding 
was affirmed by the greatest English and American legal treatise writers 
of the late eighteenth century, William Blackstone and James Kent, 
respectively.  A close reading of the First Congress’s Naturalization Act 
of 1790 also confirms this original understanding and the extent to 
which early Americans were aware of the landmark 1350 statute De 
Natis Ultra Mare, the earliest English legal manifestation of jus sanguinis 
as applied to the children of English subjects born beyond the sea. 
Nor does a 1784 Maryland Statute making Lafayette and “his male 
heirs forever” lead to the conclusion that early Americans believed that 
legislatures could bestow natural born citizen status on any person with 
a connection to the United States, even foreigners.  The provision in 
Article II of the Constitution making any citizen at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution eligible for the President took care of any 
foreigner worthy of being deemed eligible for the President by having 
participated in founding the country.  Thus, the Maryland statute 
manifested a one-time historical exception, not a precedent for 
plenary congressional power to determine who is a “natural born 
Citizen” eligible to be President.  The one area of discretion Congress 
did have pertaining to natural born citizen status was setting a 
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residency requirement on the U.S. citizen father from whom a foreign-
born child derived U.S. citizenship. 
Finally, no after-enacted constitutional provision addresses or 
modifies Article II’s requirement that a person must be a “natural born 
Citizen” to be eligible to be President.  Nor has the Supreme Court 
decided a case regarding the meaning of the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause or whether any after-enacted amendments like the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause has altered the Article II 
conditions for presidential eligibility.  Consequently, the original 
meaning of that provision when it was adopted between 1787 and 1789 
remains an important and unanswered question of constitutional 
interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution requires a President to be a 
“natural born Citizen.”  But, as the Supreme Court once observed:  
“The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born 
citizens.  Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that.”415  The words 
appear not to have been used in any law in the United States for the 
past two centuries, and have not been used in any U.S. national law 
since 1790.  To date, no one has offered a clear and persuasive account 
of the phrase’s original meaning. 
Original meanings are rarely ascertainable, but this case is a rare 
exception.  The relevant historical evidence, which was exhaustively 
reviewed in this Article—Constitutional Convention debates, English 
common law, natural law, law of nations, canonical Anglo-American 
treatises like Blackstone’s and Kent’s, the 1784 Maryland Lafayette 
statute, the 1790 U.S. Naturalization Statute—all lead to the 
conclusion that the original meaning of “natural born Citizen” in 
Article II refers to a person either born in the United States, or outside 
it to a parent in government service or to a U.S. citizen father.  This 
answer is faithful to then-universal natural law principles of jus soli and 
jus sanguinis, and to the material condition of the early United States 
as a new nation geographically distant from Europe but dependent on 
it for trade and commerce. 
What should we do with this original meaning today, when no one 
believes in natural law principles of “born” citizenship and has not for 
a long time?  I venture only preliminary thoughts here.  Any attempt 
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to translate the original meaning to present-day reality is stymied by 
the fact that the anchor concept is now extinct.  To underscore the 
point, imagine that Article II had limited presidential eligibility to “a 
citizen under ancient Roman republican principles” instead.  (The 
possibility is not as outrageous as it may seem, given the framing 
generation’s deep respect for the ancient Roman republic and its 
institutions—e.g., the Senate and the Consulship, which was an 
inspiration for the Presidency itself.)  This hypothetical provision 
would more transparently require us to analyze a candidate’s eligibility 
under extinct historical standards.  Modern constitutionalists might 
very well decide to ignore such an anachronistic condition altogether 
despite its plain-language clarity, or strongly urge a constitutional 
amendment.  Others more favorably disposed to original meanings 
might insist on the necessity of historical research to figure out who 
counted as a citizen under ancient Roman republican principles, and 
on enforcing the fruits of the research as a requirement on presidential 
eligibility today.  The more elusive historicity of Article II’s “natural 
born Citizen” requirement, however, has sparked neither politically 
prominent demands to abolish or amend it, nor a more coherent 
conception of what implementing the original meaning entails. 
My findings on the original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen 
Clause reveal that it was not grounded exclusively on jus soli or jus 
sanguinis, but rather incorporated both natural law principles.  This 
realization has important implications for modern applications.  For 
instance, a strict adherence to jus soli might compel the conclusion that 
a person born in the United States of foreign parents within the 
country on a temporary but non-diplomatic status such as students or 
in violation of U.S. immigration laws, would be a natural born citizen 
eligible to be President of the United States.  But an understanding 
that the concept of “natural born Citizen’ in Article II also 
encompassed jus sanguinis throws doubt on sole reliance on jus soli to 
determine who is eligible to be President.  On the other hand, relying 
exclusively on jus sanguinis might lead one to conclude that a person 
born abroad to a U.S. citizen father himself born overseas to a U.S. 
citizen father might count as a “natural born Citizen.”  But the adopters of 
the Constitution did not eschew connection to U.S. soil altogether, for 
instance, by enacting statutes requiring the citizen father’s residence 
in the United States, like the 1790 Naturalization Act. 
From a present-day perspective, the greatest misgivings about 
implementing the original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause 
arise from the blatant sexism of the natural law principle of jus 
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sanguinis.  Even in the twentieth century when natural law had receded 
as a wellspring of citizenship jurisprudence and long after the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause had been adopted, 
American laws proceeded on the assumption that children inherited 
the citizenship status of their fathers, not their mothers.  Indeed, in 
many states, courts hewed to the view that married women (not just 
children) acquired the citizenship or domicile status of their husbands 
well into the twentieth century.  But those sexist doctrines and laws 
have been retired for decades now. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how Article II’s “natural born 
Citizen” requirement violates any other provision of the Constitution 
by limiting presidential eligibility to children born abroad of U.S. 
citizen fathers but not mothers, unless the mother is in government 
service.  No one has a right to be President of the United States, and 
so denial of presidential eligibility is not like denial of the right to vote 
or to equal treatment in schools or in the general workplace.  
Moreover, it is of no consequence whether the child of a U.S. citizen 
father born abroad is a male or a female:  the jus sanguinis prong of 
the “natural born Citizen” requirement operates at the level of the 
parent, not the child.  And the Supreme Court’s decisions on the 
citizenship status of children born abroad to U.S. citizens abroad have 
not focused at all on Article II presidential eligibility; nor are they 
directly relevant, with the exception of Sessions v. Morales-Santana,416 
which commands the same prior residence requirement for citizen 
fathers as citizen mothers to children born abroad. 
Given these considerations, what the courts should do with the 
natural-law original meaning of the Natural Born Citizen Clause—e.g., 
whether to stick by it or to hold it outdated by present realities of 
gender and globalism—in cases before them is beyond the scope of 
the Article.  Indeed, some courts have held the Clause to be non-
justiciable,417 but, as one state judge has concluded,418 that view seems 
misguided since the question is one of constitutional interpretation 
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that does not trespass on the constitutional powers of the political 
branches.  The aim of this Article, rather, has been to present all the 
historical evidence and analyze it in an even-handed way.  One very 
strong impression I have formed from the exercise is the startling 
contingency of this enigmatic constitutional provision.  If John Jay had 
never written his two-sentence note to Washington in late July 1787, 
the original draft would likely have prevailed, and any U.S. citizen who 
had been an inhabitant of the United States for twenty-one years would 
have been eligible to be President.  At least for me, this contingency 
raises doubt whether commitment to our Constitution requires blind 
fidelity to every single word in its text.  Words, after all, are only as 
perfect as their creators, and so is our written Constitution. 
